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The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime 
Areas 
Ben Grunwald* and Jeffrey Fagan** 
In 2000, the Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Wardlow that a 
suspect’s presence in a “high-crime area” is relevant in determining 
whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct an 
investigative stop. Despite the importance of the decision, the Court 
provided no guidance about what that standard means, and over 
fifteen years later, we still have no idea how police officers understand 
and apply it in practice. This Article conducts the first empirical 
analysis of Wardlow by examining data on over two million 
investigative stops conducted by the New York Police Department from 
2007 to 2012.  
Our results suggest that Wardlow may have been wrongly 
decided. Specifically, we find evidence that officers often assess 
whether areas are high crime using a very broad geographic lens; that 
they call almost every block in the city high crime; that their 
assessments of whether an area is high crime are nearly uncorrelated 
with actual crime rates; that the suspect’s race predicts whether an 
officer calls an area high crime as well as the actual crime rate; that 
the racial composition of the area and the identity of the officer are 
stronger predictors of whether an officer calls an area high crime than 
the crime rate itself; and that stops are less or as likely to result in the 
detection of contraband when an officer invokes high-crime area as a  
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basis of a stop. We conclude with several policy proposals for courts, 
police departments, and scholars to help address these problems in the 
doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every year, police officers stop and frisk millions of pedestrians on the 
street.1 One of the most common justifications they cite for these stops is that the 
suspect was located in a “high-crime area” (HCA).2 In 2000, the Supreme Court 
gave formal approval to that practice in Illinois v. Wardlow, by holding that a 
suspect’s presence in a high-crime area is relevant in determining whether an 
officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop.3 In doing so, the Court 
sanctioned a dramatic expansion in police discretion that has impacted “almost 
every” case challenging the constitutionality of a stop.4 
Despite the importance of the decision, the Court provided remarkably little 
guidance on how to interpret and implement the high-crime area standard in 
practice. Indeed, the opinion said nothing at all about what “high-crime area” 
means, and the lower courts have made little progress filling the gap. As a result, 
officers haven’t been told how to apply the high-crime area standard—how to 
think about its proper geographic scope, its relevant temporal horizon, or about 
the kinds of crimes that are most relevant.5 Wardlow also said nothing about the 
relevant evidentiary standards for establishing that an area is high crime. In 
response, the lower courts have been remarkably lax in scrutinizing officers’ 
claims about high-crime areas. The most common approach is to defer to the 
 
 1. See ELIZABETH DAVIS ET AL., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 4 
(2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGS7-L3FM] (estimating 
that American police departments conducted 2.5 million street stops in 2015 against residents age sixteen 
or older); see also Chris Palmer, Philly Police Decreasing Use of Stop-and-Frisk, Officials Say, 
INQUIRER (May 2, 2017), http://www2.philly.com/philly/news/crime/Philly-Police-decreasing-use-of-
stop-and-frisk-officials-say.html [https://perma.cc/T3T2-RQC8] (reporting that the Philadelphia Police 
Department conducted 140,000 stops in 2016); Jeremy Gorner & Dan Hinkel, New Report Shows 
Chicago Police Street Stops Down, Minorities Still Stopped More, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-stop-and-frisk-report-met-
20170324-story.html [https://perma.cc/M6FT-X2HM] (reporting that the Chicago Police Department 
conducted 54,000 stops in the first six months of 2016); Justin Fenton, State Police Don’t Analyze Stop 
& Frisk Data, Either, BALT. SUN (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-
investigates/bs-md-sun-investigates-stop-and-frisk-20131214-story.html [https://perma.cc/VMW7-
5LJT] (reporting that the Baltimore Police Department conducted 120,000 stops in 2012). 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). A high-crime area, on its own, cannot establish reasonable 
suspicion. Instead, it can increase suspicion by providing an additional factor to other factors, or by 
enhancing the salience of other factors that, outside the context of a “high crime area,” may not be 
sufficient to justify a stop. See People v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding 
that absent additional factors, the fact that a person is observing a location and appears to be on the 
lookout for something is insufficient to justify a stop and frisk). 
 4. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High Crime Area” Question: 
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1590 (2008). 
 5. See id. at 1618. 
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expertise of the police officer, often adopting his6 bare testimony that an area is 
“high crime” without additional proof.7 
In the absence of a legal definition of high-crime areas and of meaningful 
judicial scrutiny, police officers enjoy wide discretion to define high-crime areas 
however they want. The wisdom of Wardlow as a constitutional doctrine thus 
depends heavily on how police officers exercise their discretion while 
implementing it in practice. 
We argue that Wardlow depends on at least three unspoken empirical 
assumptions. The first assumption concerns the geographic scope of a high-crime 
area. The few lower courts that have confronted this question have generally 
agreed that high-crime areas should be analyzed through a granular geographic 
lens—more like a street block or intersection than a neighborhood or city.8 
The second assumption is that officers’ assessments of high-crime areas are 
relatively accurate. There are some good reasons to question that assumption. 
For one thing, officers may not always be aware of actual crime rates, which can 
fluctuate over time. Their assessments might also be skewed by bureaucratic 
pressures to increase the number of stops they conduct even if they lack 
constitutional justification.9 And officers’ assessments of high-crime areas might 
also be influenced by racial and socioeconomic biases based on the 
characteristics of suspects and neighborhoods in which their stops take place.10 
 
 6. Throughout the Article, we use “he/him” pronouns, both because the vast majority officers 
in the NYPD—82 percent—are men and because our data do not allow us to separate male and female 
officers in our analysis. See What is the Gender Breakdown of Active NYPD Officers?, CIVILIAN 
COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/policy/data-transparency-initiative-
mos.page#gender [https://perma.cc/2PP2-55W6]. 
 7. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 4, at 1607 (“[T]he majority of 
jurisdictions . . . primarily have relied on an officer’s testimony that an area is a ‘high-crime area’ 
without much analysis as to the basis of that conclusion.”); see also Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See 
What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY 
L. & POL’Y 135, 135 (2002) (“As an eager young Assistant United States Attorney who ‘papered’ 
countless complaints, conducted numerous hearings, and tried a substantial number of cases, I learned 
how to decode police officer jargon and law enforcement terminology. One of the most commonly 
used—yet seldom defined—phrases was ‘high crime area.’ . . . [In court] judges rarely challenged the 
proffered label or required its definition. Judges never asked officers for data to support assertions that 
an area was high-crime.”); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“[M]y colleagues don’t even pause to ask the questions. To them, it’s a high 
crime area, because the officers say it’s a high crime area.”); see, e.g., State v. Morgan, 539 N.W.2d 887, 
892 (Wis. 1995) (“[W]e find that an officer’s perception of an area as ‘high-crime’ can be a factor 
justifying a search.”); Riley v. Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d 724, 726 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining 
that the officer testified that the stop took place in a “high crime area”). 
 8. See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., Floyd v. New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 591–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Floyd I”) 
(documenting live testimony, depositions, roll call recordings of supervisors, internal NYPD documents, 
and survey results and concluding that the most plausible explanation for a 700 percent increase in stops 
from 2002 to 2011 was the result of “significant pressure” on police officers “to increase their stop 
activity”). 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
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The third empirical assumption concerns predictive power. Like any other 
Fourth Amendment factor, a suspect’s presence in a high-crime area only 
supports reasonable suspicion if that fact predicts, on average, whether a suspect 
is engaged in crime. Wardlow thus assumes that, controlling for other stated 
bases of reasonable suspicion, there is a higher probability that a suspect is 
engaged in a crime where the officer invokes high-crime area as a basis of a stop. 
Nearly two decades have passed since the Supreme Court issued Wardlow, 
and yet we have almost no evidence about how police officers apply the high-
crime area standard. We therefore don’t know whether any of these empirical 
assumptions are satisfied in practice. 
Our goal in this Article is to evaluate Wardlow by testing its empirical 
assumptions directly. To do so, we use a dataset of over two million police stops 
conducted by the New York Police Department (NYPD) between 2007 and 
2012. The data derive from forms that officers are required to complete after 
every stop. The forms collect rich information on suspect demographics and the 
precise geographic location of each stop. The data also contain anonymized 
officer identifiers, which allow us to observe how the same officer behaves in 
different areas, and how different officers behave in the same areas. And, most 
important for our purposes, the forms require officers to check off a series of 
roughly twenty boxes, indicating the bases of suspicion that justified the stop. 
Fortunately, one of those boxes is for high-crime areas. We merged this dataset 
with crime statistics and racial and demographic information on small 
geographic areas in New York City. 
Of course, we need to be careful about how we interpret our stop-form 
dataset. One possibility is that it tells us about the ex ante, subjective mental state 
of a police officer—that is, it describes the reasons an officer believed a stop was 
lawful moments before he carried it out. To a limited extent, we hope we can 
learn something about that internal mental process, but the data face significant 
limitations to serve that purpose. Indeed, officers fill out the form after 
completing their stops and they may therefore engage in post-hoc rationalization. 
Still, our data may offer a very rough proxy of what officers were thinking in the 
moment—a proxy that’s better than anything else currently available. 
Perhaps a more fitting interpretation of the stop-form data is that they 
describe the ex post, objective factors a police officer would use to justify a stop 
if he were ever asked to do so in court. This objective perspective is particularly 
important in the Fourth Amendment context where, under Whren v. United 
States,11 the officer’s subjective mental state is irrelevant in assessing whether a 
stop is unconstitutional. The data are well suited to illuminate that objective 
 
 11. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“To the extent the magistrate judge made the same mistake as the dissent, by finding reasonable 
suspicion for a traffic stop lacking based on the officer’s subjective motivations, we reverse. The parsing 
of police motives—as opposed to ‘articulable facts’—is precisely what Whren tells us we may not do.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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perspective. For one thing, just a few years before our data begin, the check 
boxes on the stop forms were created as a result of a lawsuit against the NYPD 
to require the department to document the bases of suspicion in every stop.12 For 
another, when a stop is challenged at a suppression hearing, officers are 
incentivized to give testimony consistent with the contents of their stop form. 
Indeed, the form is typically discoverable, which means the defense can impeach 
an officer whose testimony deviates from it.13 For these reasons, our data appear 
well suited for examining the objective factors—including the high-crime area 
factor—that an officer would raise to justify each stop. 
Turning to our results, our empirical analyses provide significant evidence 
that none of Wardlow’s empirical assumptions are satisfied in practice. With 
respect to the first, our regression models suggest that officers often assess 
whether an area is high crime through a broad geographic lens. In many of our 
models, police precinct-level measures of crime (on average, four square miles) 
are substantially stronger predictors of whether an officer invokes HCA than 
measures of crime at a smaller level of geography, the census block group (.05 
square miles). That’s particularly true for violent- and property-crime stops. This 
suggests that officers frequently apply the high-crime area standard to large 
geographic areas such as police precincts. 
Even more important, our results also provide little support for Wardlow’s 
second assumption. Officers invoke HCA in 57 percent of all stops—more often 
than any other basis of reasonable suspicion. And, while officers invoke HCA 
more often in certain parts of the city than others, they frequently do so 
everywhere. Indeed, in 98 percent of census block groups, officers invoked HCA 
in at least 30 percent of stops. In other words, officers are claiming that every 
block in New York City is high crime at one time or another. That claim seems 
implausible—particularly in the “safest big city in America.”14 
More to the point, officers’ assessments of whether areas are high crime 
appear inaccurate. Despite our best efforts to predict HCA based on measures of 
crime at different levels of geography, temporal horizons, and crime types, our 
most predictive models produced an R2 of just 0.01. In other words, actual crime 
 
 12. The case that resulted in this settlement was Daniels. v. New York, 138 F. Supp. 2d 562 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 13. See People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881, 884 (N.Y. 1961) (holding that the defense is entitled 
to discovery of prior statements by a prosecution witness); JAMES E. MORRIS ET AL., VILLAGE, TOWN 
AND DISTRICT COURTS IN NEW YORK § 4:188 (2017) (“Police reports (insofar as they are written by an 
officer who will testify, or contain statements of witnesses), prior testimony, and notes relevant to a 
suppression issue are turned over as Rosario material.”); PETER GERSTENZANG & ERIC H. SILLS, 
HANDLING THE DWI CASE IN NEW YORK § 28:3 (2017) (“Obviously, the written notes and reports of 
a police officer witness constitute Rosario material.”). 
 14. Pamela Engel, Mayor Bloomberg: ‘Stop and Frisk’ Has Made New York City the Safest Big 
City in America, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/mayor-bloomberg-
stop-and-frisk-has-made-new-york-city-the-safest-city-in-america-2013-8 [https://perma.cc/6DCW-
XX9Z]. 
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rates predicted only one percent of the variation in officers’ assessments of 
whether areas are high crime. 
If actual crime rates don’t explain whether an officer invokes HCA as a 
basis of a stop, what does? One partial answer is that racial and socioeconomic 
biases may influence officers’ determinations. When we analyze all stops 
together and control for local crime conditions, we find that a given officer in a 
given area is more likely to invoke HCA against young, Black, male suspects. 
When we break the data up by the type of suspected crime, we find that the higher 
invocation rates against Blacks is concentrated among stops for violent crime. 
We also find evidence that, in assessing whether an area is high crime, officers 
rely on neighborhood proxies, such as the racial and socioeconomic composition 
of residents. For example, when we analyze all stops together, across all of our 
models, moving a stop from an area with virtually no Black residents to an area 
with 100 percent Black residents is associated with a larger increase in the 
probability that an officer invokes HCA than moving from the single safest area 
in the city to the single most dangerous. This pattern appears to be concentrated 
in stops where the suspected crime is a violent, drug, or weapons offense. 
Inter-officer disparities might also help explain when officers invoke HCA. 
Controlling for area of the city, roughly a quarter of officers invoke HCA in just 
25 percent of stops, while another 40 percent do so over 75 percent of the time. 
These results raise strong doubts as to whether the invocation of HCA has 
any predictive power about whether a suspect is engaged in crime. If not, the 
third empirical assumption of Wardlow does not hold. We examine this question 
by measuring the correlation between whether an officer invokes HCA as the 
basis of a stop and whether that stop results in a recorded “hit”—an arrest, the 
recovery of a weapon, or the recovery of other contraband. Our analysis here is 
necessarily limited because we can only observe the suspects that were stopped; 
we cannot observe suspects that officers chose not to stop (perhaps because they 
lacked reasonable suspicion). Still, our results are informative even if they are 
censored. For two of our three “hit” variables—arrest and recovery of a 
weapon—when we control for other observable bases of suspicion, we find that 
the probability of an arrest or the recovery of a weapon decreases when an officer 
invokes HCA to justify the stop. In other words, when an officer invokes HCA, 
the suspect is less likely to be engaged in a crime. This suggests that HCA may 
not be an indicator of guilt at all. It further suggests that officers may invoke 
HCA to manufacture the appearance of reasonable suspicion in their weakest 
stops. For our third hit variable—whether the officer recovered any contraband 
other than a weapon—we find that the probability of a hit remains the same when 
the officer invokes HCA. 
Taken together, our findings provide empirical evidence that Wardlow may 
have been wrongly decided. Indeed, implementation of the high-crime area 
standard appears haphazard at best and discriminatory at worst. Officers call 
nearly every block in the city high crime at one time or another. Their 
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assessments of high-crime areas are only weakly correlated with actual crime 
rates. The suspect’s race predicts whether an officer deems an area high crime as 
well as the actual crime rate itself. The racial composition of the area and the 
identity of the officer are stronger predictors of whether an officer deems an area 
high crime than the crime rate. And officers may even be using high-crime area 
as cover to bolster the appearance of constitutional validity in their weakest 
stops. These findings raise important questions about whether police officers can 
responsibly wield the discretion granted to them under Wardlow. 
Of course, in this Article, we only evaluate the implementation of the high-
crime area standard by one department during one time period.15 Officers in other 
departments may be applying it with greater fidelity, and we cannot rule out this 
possibility with our data. But we ourselves are somewhat doubtful as the NYPD 
is one of the most organized, centralized, data-driven, and well-funded police 
departments in the country. 
Short of reversing Wardlow, the courts have tools at their disposal to 
address some of the problems we have uncovered with the doctrine. Perhaps 
most simply, they could demand more rigorous data in suppression hearings to 
support an officer’s claim that an area is high crime.16 We suspect this solution 
would not go far enough, however, because it would only address the tiny 
fraction of stops that result in a criminal charge and motion to suppress.17 Courts 
could go further by developing more precise definitions about the geographic 
scope, temporal horizon, and kinds of crimes relevant in assessing whether an 
area is high crime. A more aggressive judicial approach might prohibit a 
department from using high-crime areas to justify stops if there is evidence its 
officers are systematically misapplying the standard.18 Police departments that 
do not faithfully implement the standard should not be able to use it to justify 
their stops. 
We recognize that these proposals depart, at least to some extent, from how 
courts treat other factors under the reasonable suspicion analysis. Applying those 
other factors typically involves a highly discretionary, fact-bound inquiry based 
on the totality of circumstances and the common-sense judgments of the police 
 
 15. Our data are from 2007 to 2012, before a federal court ruled NYPD’s stop and frisk program 
unconstitutional. See infra subsection I.A. 
 16. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 4, at 1593. 
 17. See Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-
and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 175 n.81 (2015) (“[O]nly a tiny 
fraction of stops are ever litigated because only a few result in an arrest, let alone a trial.”). As others 
have noted, this is a general problem with the exclusionary rule as a remedy to constitutional violations. 
See, e.g., Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367–72 
(1974). 
 18. This proposal is consistent with a recent call by Tracey Meares to review investigative stops, 
not as individual incidents, but instead as part of a larger organization-wide program. See Meares, supra 
note 17, at 174–76. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379361 
2019] THE END OF INTUITION-BASED HIGH-CRIME AREAS 353 
officer.19 But, perhaps, the reason that the Fourth Amendment has taken this 
shape over time is that there were no other options. Historically, courts lacked 
access to the data needed to validate how police officers invoke Fourth 
Amendment factors in the field. Indeed, as the Supreme Court explained in 
Wardlow itself: 
In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have 
available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from 
suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific 
certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists. 
Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on 
commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.20 
As we try to show in this Article, that moment may be coming to an end. 
Courts are not the only institutions that should reconsider how they handle 
the high-crime area standard. Police departments can promulgate regulations to 
guide officers.21 Technological innovation can also help. The Philadelphia Police 
Department recently gave patrol officers smart phones with information on 
crimes occurring in the surrounding area.22 Such devices could be used to inform 
officers in real time about objective crime data so that they do not need to rely 
on their own subjective and potentially unreliable intuitions about local crime 
rates. These devices could limit discretion even further by simply informing 
officers whether they are, at any given moment, in a high-crime area based on 
crime data and departmental policy. 
In addition to these specific proposals, the implications of our analysis 
extend further—beyond the high-crime area standard—in at least two ways. 
First, our analysis offers a more general lesson about the response of police to 
different forms of judicial regulation. For example, it’s perhaps unsurprising that, 
once courts recognized “furtive movement” as a cognizable factor in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis, police began to see furtive movements 
everywhere.23 That concept is so vague, slippery, and contentless that any 
 
 19. See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (“[Reasonable suspicion] takes 
into account ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’”); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
125 (2000) (“[T]he determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments 
and inferences about human behavior.”). 
 20. 528 U.S. at 124–25. 
 21. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing 
“High-Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 219–24 (2011); Kelly K. Koss, Note, Leveraging 
Predictive Policing Algorithms to Restore Fourth Amendment Protections in High-Crime Areas in a 
Post-Wardlow World, 90 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 301, 305 (2015); Hannah Rose Wisniewski, Note, It’s 
Time to Define High-Crime: Using Statistics in Court to Support an Officer’s Subjective “High-Crime 
Area” Designation, 38 NEW ENG. J. CRIM & CIV. CONFINEMENT 101, 120–22 (2012). 
 22. HUNCHLAB, HUNCHLAB: UNDER THE HOOD (2015), 
https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/hunchlab/HunchLab-Under-the-Hood.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DQH-
NYB3]. 
 23. See Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry 
Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 69–81 (2015). 
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behavior might qualify.24 But, in principle, the concept of a high-crime area 
could be operationalized in a manner that is more objective and verifiable. And 
yet, police officers appear able to misuse that more regulable standard too. The 
story of Wardlow thus teaches that, for the Fourth Amendment to impose a 
meaningful constraint on police discretion, the courts may need to develop more 
specific standards about what reasonable suspicion factors mean or, 
alternatively, to require that police do so through internal regulations.25 Leaving 
the definition of those factors up to line officers on the street appears to be a 
dangerous proposition. 
Second, our findings open the door to a largely uncharted area of empirical 
legal scholarship on the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, officers rely on countless 
factors other than high-crime areas in justifying the millions of stops they 
conduct each year. Officers may be applying some of those factors unfaithfully 
as well. Our analysis is therefore just the first step. We suggest that empirical 
legal scholars should begin validating other bases of reasonable suspicion on 
which officers regularly rely. Below, we identify several methodologies that 
could substantially advance this research agenda.26 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, we briefly 
describe the historical development of the investigative stop and its current use 
in policing practice today. In Part II, we layer on the high-crime area standard, 
discussing Wardlow and how the lower courts have applied the doctrine. We also 
describe and justify the empirical assumptions of the high-crime area standard. 
Part III describes our data, and Part IV details the results of our empirical 
analysis. In Part V, we explore the implications of our findings for courts, police, 
and the Fourth Amendment more generally. 
I. 
INVESTIGATIVE STOPS 
Police officers commonly invoke the high-crime area standard to justify 
investigative stops. In this section, we begin with a brief description of the 
 
 24. The term “furtive movements” refers to a nearly infinite number of actions which an officer 
might find suspicious. The term often arises in cases in that an individual is suspected of carrying a 
firearm. Absent more bases of suspicion, furtive movements alone do not give rise to reasonable 
suspicion. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 667 N.Y.S.2d 725, 727–28 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that officers 
did not have reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect walking with his arm stiffly against his body in a 
high-crime area); People v. Fernandez, 928 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (holding that 
an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop or frisk a suspect in a high-crime area whose hand 
was near his waist or in his sweatshirt pocket). Some courts have already expressed serious doubts about 
furtive movements. See, e.g., Floyd v. New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Floyd 
II”) (“‘Furtive movements’ are an insufficient basis for a stop or frisk if the officer cannot articulate 
anything more specific about the suspicious nature of the movement.”). 
 25. See generally John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. 
L. REV. 205, 213–20 (2015) (analyzing the benefits and advantages of judicial regulation aimed at line 
officers versus department administrators). 
 26. See infra Part V. 
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historical evolution of the investigative stop and its role as a dominant policing 
strategy today. We then describe the basic legal framework regulating such stops 
and what we know about how they’re typically conducted. 
A. A Brief History 
Police have likely conducted investigative stops since the early days of 
American police departments in the mid-1800s.27 Back then, policing strategy 
was largely reactive. Officers spent much of their time conducting random street 
patrols and responding to and investigating crimes reported by civilians.28 
Investigative stops were, therefore, primarily used to respond to and investigate 
crimes that had already occurred.29 
The largely reactive character of the investigative stop began to change, 
however, in the early twentieth century. At the time, police experts and 
administrators were embracing more proactive approaches to policing, which 
focused not only on investigating past crimes but also preventing future ones.30 
By the 1960s, the investigative stop had already become a core crime prevention 
tool with regularized procedures.31 Police officers would stop and interrogate a 
 
 27. For a few early cases, see Bishop v. Lucy, 50 S.W. 1029, 1029 (1899); Gisske v. Sanders, 
98 P. 43, 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908). 
 28. See Christine N. Famega, Proactive Policing by Post and Community Officers, 55 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 78, 80 (2009). 
 29. For example, in one early case, after a police officer was informed that a burglary and 
robbery had occurred near a particular intersection in Los Angeles, he stopped and questioned a 
“suspicious character . . . in that vicinity.” Gisske, 98 P. at 44. The language of the opinion implies that 
this tactic was relatively common at the time. Indeed, the officer’s right to conduct the stop was so 
obvious the court saw no need to provide any citation or argument for support. Id.at 45 (“A police officer 
has a right to make inquiry in a proper manner of any one upon the public streets at a late hour as to his 
identity and the occasion of his presence, if the surroundings are such as to indicate to a reasonable man 
that the public safety demands such identification.”). In another early case, two police officers in Austin 
were informed that a burglary had occurred at a brewing association. Soon after, they stopped and 
questioned a civilian two blocks away from the crime scene and arrested him for the burglary. Bishop, 
50 S.W. at 1029. Once again, the opinion’s language gives no indication this practice was unusual at the 
time. 
 30. See, e.g., O. W. Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for 
Modernization, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 395, 398 (1960) (“It is better to have an 
alert police force that prevents the crime than one that devotes its time to seeking to identify the assailant 
after the life has been taken, the daughter ravished, or the pedestrian slugged and robbed.”). 
 31. See Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 320 (1942) (“Every day 
large numbers of persons are questioned by police officers. This questioning, without immediate arrest, 
is essential to proper policing. . . . A man who looks round furtively, tries the door of an automobile, 
steps in and seems unfamiliar with its mechanism, may or may not have a right to drive the car. Under 
such circumstances, a passing officer ought to question the suspicious behavior.”); Lawrence P. Tiffany, 
Field Interrogation: Administrative, Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 DENV. L.J. 389, 389 
(1966) (“A common police practice, probably in all localities, is to stop and question suspects on the 
street when there are insufficient grounds to arrest.”); id. at 395 (“A police officer may stop and question 
any person . . . whom he may have reason to suspect of unlawful design, and may demand of him his 
business and where he is going. . . . No law-abiding citizen will object to being questioned if it is done 
in a polite manner.” (quoting RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE POLICE DEP’T OF THE CITY OF 
PONTIAC § 230 (Jan. 1941)); Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE 
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“suspicious” individual on the street even if they lacked the probable cause 
required to conduct an arrest.32 
Despite the expanding purpose of the investigative stop, its growth in the 
middle of the twentieth century was limited by at least two considerations. First, 
by the 1960s, the legality of the practice was unclear because the Supreme Court 
had not yet decided whether an investigative stop would qualify as a full-blown 
arrest and thus require probable cause, rather than some lower evidentiary 
showing.33 Second, for much of the twentieth century, experts advocated for 
increased police professionalism and a reduction in police discretion.34 As a 
result, police “managers began to focus all their training and resources on 
enforcing laws against serious crime,” rather than on low-level, order-
maintenance offenses—like drunkenness, panhandling, street prostitution, 
loitering, and rowdiness.35 This new focus on serious crime likely reduced the 
frequency with which officers could conduct investigative stops.36 
 
L.J. 1161, 1161 (1966) (reporting that the author had been stopped by the police nine or ten times in the 
last “few years” and noting that during the most recent stop the officer said “he had the right to stop 
anyone any place any time—and for no reason”); Meares, supra note 17, at 167 (describing Operation 
S, a police strategy in the 1950s, in which a designated unit in the San Francisco Police Department 
conducted thousands of stops annually). 
 32. See John A. Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York’s “Stop and Frisk” Law, 33 
FORDHAM L. REV. 211 (1964) (quoting from N.Y. Code Crim. Proc § 180-a, which authorizes the 
stopping and questioning of persons whom the police reasonably suspect are engaging in crime). 
 33. See Tiffany, supra note 31, at 395 (noting that many police officers in Chicago believed that 
field interrogations were arrests and were thus illegal absent probable cause); Loren G. Stern, Stop and 
Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 532, 
533 (1967) (explaining that police officers were “never quite sure whether a detention was 
constitutionally valid”). Some have argued that the common law provided police officers the power to 
conduct investigative stops based on a lower evidentiary standard than probable cause, but that view is 
disputed. See David Alan Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1739, 1812 (2000). 
 34. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1742–44 (2005) 
(discussing the turn to police professionalism in the 1950s and 1960s). 
 35. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, 
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 579 (1997) (emphasis added); see also 
DAVID B. WOLCOTT, COPS AND KIDS: POLICING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN URBAN AMERICA, 1890–
1940, 146–47 (2005) (“Rather than focus on maintaining public order, as urban police departments had 
done in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, police departments came to prioritize fighting 
crime in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather than see their primary functions as providing general services and 
arresting ne’er-do-wells for disorderly conduct, police came to define their purpose more narrowly as 
investigating and preventing crimes against persons and property, and apprehending and punishing 
criminals.”). This trend was reinforced by a contemporary wave of judicial opinions that struck down 
many order-maintenance statutes as unconstitutionally vague. See Livingston, supra, at 598–600. 
 36. In 1960, police officers arrested 2.3 million people for drunkenness, disorderly conduct, 
vagrancy and other low-level crimes, which in total, accounted for roughly 52 percent of all non-traffic 
arrests in the country. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF 
DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 89 (1990). In 1985, however, officers conducted only 1.4 
million such arrests, which accounted for just 16 percent of all non-traffic arrests throughout the country. 
Id. This intense redirection of police resources—from low-level order-maintenance crimes to more 
serious offenses—restricted the reach of the investigative stop as a policing program. 
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Both this legal and philosophical limit on investigative stops eventually 
disappeared. In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved any lingering 
constitutional doubts in Terry v. Ohio, by holding that investigative stops do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.37 Soon enough, the philosophical aversion 
against order-maintenance policing also fell away. In 1982, George Kelling and 
James Q. Wilson published an article in The Atlantic called “Broken 
Windows.”38 The authors argued that “minor disorder in a neighborhood, if left 
unchecked, . . . will result in increased serious crime, and, therefore, that 
eliminating minor disorder . . . will have a deterrent effect on major crime.”39 
According to Wilson and Kelling, focusing police resources exclusively on 
“serious” crime was a mistake. Instead, they argued that officers should prioritize 
low-level, order-maintenance enforcement and that departments should deploy 
more officers on foot to carry out those responsibilities. 
It’s hard to overstate the influence of “Broken Windows” on the use of the 
investigative stop.40 Almost immediately, departments across the country began 
putting order-maintenance policing into action.41 This trend expanded officers’ 
discretion to stop a larger universe of people who were engaged in low-level 
offenses.42 Indeed, police departments boasted that enforcing these low-level 
offenses enabled them to stop more people and thus remove more weapons and 
drugs from the street.43 
In the 1990s, the NYPD—the research site of the current study—developed 
an approach to order-maintenance policing44 that would once more transform the 
 
 37. See 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). 
 38. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982. 
 39. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 
Conception of Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York 
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 302 (1998). 
 40. One media outlet called Broken Windows the “bible of policing;” another called order-
maintenance policing the “Holy Grail of the ‘90s.” Kevin Cullen, The Commish, BOSTON GLOBE, May 
25, 1997, at 3; Robert A. Jones, The Puzzle Waiting for the New Chief, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, at l. 
Another outlet called it a “revolution in American policing.” Christina Nifong, One Man’s Theory is 
Cutting Crime in Urban Streets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 18, 1997), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0218/021897.us.us.4.html [https://perma.cc/PNB2-H9G9]; see also 
Harcourt, supra note 39, at 293–94. 
 41. Livingston, supra note 35, at 583. 
 42. Id. at 590. 
 43. See, e.g., Ruben Castaneda, As D.C. Police Struggle on, Change Pays off in New York, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1996, at Al (“In New York, laws against so-called quality-of-life violations—
graffiti, aggressive panhandling, drinking in public—are enforced not only for their own sake but also 
because they give officers a reason to check for drugs, weapons and outstanding warrants. That has had 
a ripple effect, [NYPD Deputy Commissioner Jack] Maple said. ‘People don’t carry their guns anymore, 
because they know they might get stopped.’”). 
 44. The department issued “Police Strategy Number 5,” which was entitled “Reclaiming the 
Public Spaces of New York.” NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: 
RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW YORK 5 (1994), http://marijuana-arrests.com/docs/Bratton-
blueprint-1994--Reclaiming-the-public-spaces-of-NY.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CNG-YVDG]. The 
manual explained that order-maintenance policing would “emerge as the linchpin of efforts . . . by 
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investigative stop, this time, through technological innovation. Under the 
leadership of Commissioner William Bratton, the department created 
COMPSTAT, a “strategic management process that use[d] computer technology, 
operational strategy and managerial accountability” to increase the department’s 
capacity to reduce crime.45 One core feature of the program was a cutting-edge 
information system that could map and analyze up-to-date crime and disorder 
statistics on small geographic areas of the city.46 To promote accountability, 
high-ranking department personnel would attend weekly meetings in which 
commanders presented crime data from their precincts and would explain the 
steps they were taking to reduce crime.47 The investigative stop—also commonly 
referred to as a stop, question, and frisk—was one of the main ways commanders 
could show they were actively working to drive down the crime rate.48 
COMPSTAT’s focus on geographic crime measures helped the department 
direct its resources to areas of the city with the most crime. 
The NYPD’s appetite for investigative stops after the adoption of 
COMPSTAT was nothing short of enormous. In 1998, just four years after the 
program began, the NYPD conducted roughly 140,000 recorded stops.49 By 2011 
that number had grown to nearly 700,000 stops per year.50 Other cities that 
adopted COMPSTAT have also experienced an expansion of the practice.51 
In the last few years, the use of investigative stops has faced legal 
resistance. In 2013, well after the data in our study end, Federal District Court 
Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the NYPD’s stop and frisk program was 
systematically violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.52 The court 
ordered the department to reform its program under the oversight of a court-
appointed monitor.53 Since then, the number of recorded stops in the city has 
 
the . . . Department to reduce crime and fear in the city.” Id. It further explained that by “working 
systematically and assertively to reduce the level of disorder in the city, the NYPD w[ould] act to 
undercut the ground on which more serious crimes seem possible.” Id. 
 45. William F. Walsh, Compstat: An Analysis of an Emerging Police Managerial Paradigm, 24 
POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 347, 347 (2001). 
 46. Id. at 352. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See ELIOT SPITZER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, THE NEW YORK 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S ‘STOP & FRISK’ PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 56–57, 59 n.48. (1999). 
 49. See id. at 91 (citing 175,000 stops over a fifteen-month period from January 1998 through 
the end of March 1999.) 
 50. Floyd v. New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 51. See, e.g., Jeremy Gorner, ACLU, Chicago Agree to Changes on Controversial Street Stops, 
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2015 (noting that COMPSTAT pressured district commanders in Chicago to 
increase the use of stop and frisk). 
 52. Id. at 560–63. 
 53. Id. at 667. The Floyd Opinion and Order specified remedial actions that applied also to two 
companion stop-and-frisk cases: Davis et al. v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 427 (2013), and Ligon 
et al. v. City of New York, 743 F.3d 362 (2014). See Mayor de Blasio Announces Agreement in Landmark 
Stop-And-Frisk Case, NEW YORK CITY PRESS OFFICE (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-
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fallen dramatically.54 Stop and frisk programs at a few other departments have 
faced public resistance as well.55 Nonetheless, the investigative stop continues 
to be one of the most important tools of police departments across the country to 
reduce crime. 
B. Investigative Stops Today 
The legal framework governing investigative stops today is well known. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is the primary source 
of regulation. It requires that, before conducting a stop, an officer have 
“reasonable suspicion” that the suspect is committing or is about to commit a 
crime.56 A “mere hunch” is insufficient;57 officers must base their suspicions on 
specific and articulable facts. These facts typically relate to the suspect’s 
behavior, clothing, and location.58 They might include, for example, casing a 
store, acting as a lookout, engaging in a drug transaction, concealing potential 
contraband, or running away from an officer. Officers might also rely on softer 
signals of criminal behavior, like “furtive movements” and “bulges” in clothes 
or a waistband. 
Less is known about how investigative stops are actually carried out in 
practice. Much of what we do know comes from two cities—New York and 
Chicago—where there has been aggressive litigation regarding stop and frisk in 
recent years. The data from those two jurisdictions show that investigative stops 
fall disproportionately on people of color. In Chicago, 71 percent of recorded 
stops in the first half of 2016 were against Black civilians, who accounted for a 
 
the-mayor/news/726-14/mayor-de-blasio-agreement-landmark-stop-and-frisk-case#/0 
[https://perma.cc/3Z6N-RT5V]. 
 54. NEW YORK CITY ACLU, NYC: STOP-AND-FRISK DOWN, SAFETY UP (2015), 
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/stopfrisk_briefer_FINAL_20151210.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V2RN-GMUS]; Monitor’s Fifth Report: Analysis of NYPD Stops Reported, 2013–
2015, at 2, Floyd et al. v. City of New York, No. 1:08-cv-01034-AT-HBP (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2017). 
 55. The rate of recorded stops conducted by the Chicago Police Department, for example, has 
also fallen since the department entered into a consent agree with the ACLU in 2015. Chuck Goudie, 
CPD “Stop and Frisks” Down 80 Percent in 2016, ABC CHICAGO (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://abc7chicago.com/news/cpd-stop-and-frisks-down-80-percent-in-2016/1182604/ 
[https://perma.cc/LKB5-ECD2] (noting an 80% drop in recorded stops). The precise cause of the drop 
is unclear. The rate of recorded stops in Philadelphia also is declining in the wake of a consent decree in 
a civil rights case. Palmer, supra note 1 (reporting a 35 percemt decline in pedestrian stops in 2016 by 
the Philadelphia Police Department). See also, Plaintiffs’ Eighth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop 
and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment Practices, Bailey et al. v City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952, at 
23 (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/3273/198 
[https://perma.cc/H66N-AJP5] (concluding that “there are still too many stops and far too many stops 
without reasonable suspicion”). 
 56. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968). 
 57. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58. CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, INVESTIGATIVE ENCOUNTERS REFERENCE 
GUIDE 14–15 (2015). 
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third of the city’s population.59 In New York City from 2004 to 2012, our data 
show that 52 percent of stops were against Black civilians, who accounted for 
about 23 percent of the population in 2010.60 
In many investigative stops, the officer frisks the suspect. That’s true in 
about half of stops in New York City61 and roughly a third in Chicago.62 A frisk 
can be highly intrusive. Seth Stoughton, a former police officer, described his 
technique as follows: 
I would slide my hand . . . over the area of [the] suspect’s body that I 
was searching, moving them in small circles as I did so, so that my 
fingertips and palms might detect any protuberance in or under the 
suspect’s clothing. At the same time, I would lightly clench and release 
my fingers . . . to shift clothing over the skin so I could ensure that I 
could identify items and not mistake a weapon for a seam or fold in the 
clothing. . . .63 
Stoughton describes applying that technique to each area of the suspect’s body, 
including the midsection, waistband, groin, buttocks, upper thigh, head, 
neckline, armpits, and chest.64 
In a substantial number of stops, officers also use force against the suspect. 
Our data show that, from 2004 to 2012, NYPD officers recorded using their 
hands—which includes slapping and grabbing—in 19 percent of all stops. A 
2015 survey of Chicago residents found that 13 percent of respondents who were 
stopped in the previous twelve months were pushed or shoved.65 Officers 
 
 59. RALPH B. TAYLOR & LALLEN T. JOHNSON, ANALYSIS OF CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
POST-STOP OUTCOMES DURING INVESTIGATORY STOPS JANUARY THROUGH JUNE 2016: INPUT TO 
HON. ARLANDER KEYS’ (RET.) FIRST YEAR REPORT 32 (2017), https://www.aclu-
il.org/sites/default/files/appendix-b-analysis-of-cpd-post-stop-outcomes-during-investigatory-stops.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9VSU-DC2B]. 
 60. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE—NEW YORK CITY AND BOROUGHS 2000 
AND 2010, at 1, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/nyc-population/census2010/t_sf1_dp_
nyc_demo.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U37-5J8T]. From 2004 to 2012, 31 percent of stops were against 
Hispanic persons, who accounted for about 29 percent of the population in 2010. Id. But, after 
controlling for local crime and social conditions, stops of Hispanics were significantly more common 
than stops for whites. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing 
statistical evidence that “Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to be stopped within precincts 
and census tracts, even after controlling for other relevant variables . . . even in areas with low crime 
rates, racially heterogenous populations, or predominately white populations”) 
 61. Delores Jones-Brown & Brett G. Stoudt, Stop, Question, and Frisk Policing Practices in 
New York City: A Primer (Revised), JOHN JAY C. CRIM. JUST. 18 (2013), 
www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/app/uploads/2015/09/SQF_Primer_July_2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2P8-P758]. 
 62. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 58, at 34. 
 63. Seth W. Stoughton, Terry v. Ohio and the (Un)Forgettable Frisk, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
19, 28 (2017). 
 64. Id. at 29. 
 65. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, STOP-AND-FRISK AND TRUST IN POLICE IN CHICAGO 9 (2016), 
https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/publications/docs/workingpapers/2016/WP-16-08.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y5VZ-YDRH]. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379361 
2019] THE END OF INTUITION-BASED HIGH-CRIME AREAS 361 
sometimes use more severe forms of force. Our data show that NYPD officers 
reported drawing and pointing a weapon in less than 1 percent of stops. Survey 
data, however, suggests that officers may use weapons more frequently: 
respondents in the Chicago survey reported that officers drew a weapon in 
roughly 10 percent of stops and threatened to take out a weapon in another 6 
percent.66 
There is some evidence that the use of force during investigative stops falls 
disproportionately on people of color. A recent study by Roland Fryer, for 
example, found “large racial differences” for non-lethal uses of force.67 
However, he found no evidence of racial disparities for lethal force.68 
The vast majority of stops do not result in any further enforcement action. 
In New York City, for example, only 6 percent of all stops from 2004 to 2012 
resulted in an arrest.69 A similar proportion resulted in a summons.70 Thus, 88 
percent of stops resulted in no enforcement action, underscoring how rarely 
officers detect contraband.71 Indeed, officers recovered a weapon in only 1.5 
percent of stops and recovered other forms of contraband in less than 2 percent 
of stops.72 
These statistics suggest that the investigative stop constitutes an intrusive 
experience that is imposed largely on innocent civilians, particularly people of 
color. The Fourth Amendment is designed to balance the competing values of 
privacy and law enforcement by requiring officers to identify specific facts 
supporting reasonable suspicion. In the next section, we consider one of those 
facts in particular—high-crime areas. 
II. 
HIGH-CRIME AREAS 
The Supreme Court held in Wardlow that police officers can consider 
whether an area is “high crime” in determining whether they have reasonable 
suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.73 To be sure, this was not the first 
time courts had endorsed the use of crime rates in analyzing the constitutionality 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. ROLAND G. FRYER, JR., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN POLICE USE 
OF FORCE 3 (2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/workshop/leo/leo16_fryer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QEA8-KFYK]. 
 68. Id. at 5. But see Justin Feldman, Roland Fryer is Wrong: There is Racial Bias in Shootings 
by Police (July 12, 2016), https://scholar.harvard.edu/jfeldman/blog/roland-fryer-wrong-there-racial-
bias-shootings-police [https://perma.cc/S92Z-N7M9t]. 
 69. Floyd v. New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 70. Id. A substantial fraction of all summons are for low-level violations, rather than 
misdemeanor or felony crimes. Id. at 575 n.126. 
 71. See id. at 558–59. 
 72. Id. at 559. 
 73. See 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
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of stops.74 But the prior Supreme Court cases had primarily concerned illegal 
immigration near the border with Mexico, not typical street crime.75 Moreover, 
those cases all arose in the 1970s, well before the meaning of an “investigative 
stop” had been transformed by the NYPD in the 1990s into the aggressive stop 
and frisk program that we see across the country today.76 
As we discuss in greater detail below, Wardlow left many open questions 
about the meaning of a high-crime area and the kinds of evidence courts should 
consider in applying that standard in individual cases. For the most part, the 
lower courts have not confronted these doctrinal questions directly. Instead, the 
most common approach has been to defer to the expertise of police officers 
without engaging in meaningful scrutiny. 
A. Illinois v. Wardlow 
In Wardlow, two uniformed officers working in the special operations 
division of the Chicago Police Department were driving towards an area of the 
city “known for heavy narcotics trafficking” to investigate narcotics 
trafficking.77 They were traveling in a caravan with three other police cars 
because “they expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts 
and customers.”78 Sam Wardlow saw the officers’ vehicle and fled in the 
opposite direction, clutching an opaque bag. The officers stopped and searched 
him and found a loaded handgun in the bag. 
The Supreme Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop 
Wardlow. The Court acknowledged that an “individual’s presence in an area of 
expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough” to establish reasonable 
suspicion.79 But it also noted that “officers are not required to ignore the relevant 
characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are 
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.”80 The Court thus 
 
 74. The New York state case that defined the standards for stops also included language 
suggesting that the reputation of the area as a known crime location also heightened suspicion. See 
People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). 
 75. In one other case, the Court held that an officer had the legal authority to seize a weapon in 
plain sight on a suspect’s waistband, at least in part, due to the high levels of crime in the neighborhood. 
See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). But the Court made clear that this consideration was 
relevant to whether the officer, who was conducting a legal stop, had the authority to search the 
defendant in order to protect the officer’s safety. Id. The other cases where the Court endorsed the use 
of crime levels in assessing reasonable suspicion were immigration cases. See United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878–84 (1975); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981). In one other 
case, the Court limited the significance of the high-crime area factor by holding that, on its own, the 
factor could not establish reasonable suspicion. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). 
 76. See Rachel A. Harmon & Andrew Manns, Proactive Policing and the Legacy of Terry, 15 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 49, 55–58 (2017) (describing how Terry and other cases in the 1960s and 1970s 
predated the transformation in proactive policing without anticipating it). 
 77. 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 124. 
 80. Id. 
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concluded that the high crime level in the area, coupled with the suspect’s flight, 
was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.81 Rather than providing an 
empirical or analytical framework to evaluate the accuracy of officers’ claims 
regarding high-crime areas, the Court deferred to the police and their knowledge 
of the area’s crime rate.82 
It is difficult to assess the precise size of Wardlow’s impact on subsequent 
Fourth Amendment case law. The courts had already considered high-crime 
areas in prior Fourth Amendment decisions. Moreover, it’s hard to tell in any 
particular case whether the suspect’s presence in a high-crime area was outcome 
determinative. Still, Wardlow likely had a substantial impact on focusing courts’ 
attention on the high-crime area factor: over 4,500 federal and state decisions 
have cited the opinion since it was issued in 2000.83 
B. Lower-Court Interpretation of Wardlow 
Wardlow provided remarkably little guidance about how to apply the high-
crime area standard in individual cases. It left open two kinds of questions in 
particular. The first are questions about the substantive definition of a high-crime 
area. The second concern questions about the kinds of evidence that courts 
should rely on in assessing whether an area is high crime. We discuss how the 
lower courts have approached each of these questions in turn. 
1. Substantive Legal Standard 
Wardlow provided no substantive definition of a “high-crime area.” The 
Court thus left unanswered at least three key questions about the meaning of the 
concept, and about how it should be interpreted and applied in practice.84 First, 
the Court did not define the geographic scope of a high-crime area. Can it be as 
large as a neighborhood? Or must it be smaller, like an intersection or street 
block, or even a single residential or commercial building? Second, the Court did 
not explain how far back in time officers should look for evidence of crime. Are 
crimes that took place over a month ago relevant? What about six or twelve 
months ago? Third, the Court did not explain what kinds of crimes are relevant. 
Should we consider all crimes? Only serious ones? Only violent ones? 
Most lower courts have entirely ignored the first question, which concerns 
geographic scope. But the few that have grappled with it have demanded a 
relatively narrow geographic area. In United States v. Montero-Camargo, for 
example, the Ninth Circuit cautioned district courts to “be particularly careful to 
ensure that a ‘high crime’ area factor is not used with respect to entire 
 
 81. Id. at 124–25. 
 82. Id. 
 83. We obtained this number from Westlaw’s citing references. For an updated number, see 
WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com (search for “528 U.S. 119”; then follow “Citing References” 
hyperlink). 
 84. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 4, at 1605–07. 
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neighborhoods . . . but is limited to specific, circumscribed locations.”85 The 
Sixth Circuit has similarly held that a stop was conducted with reasonable 
suspicion in part because the relevant high-crime area was “circumscribed to a 
specific intersection rather than an entire neighborhood.”86 And the First Circuit 
has emphasized that, in assessing whether an area is high crime, a court should 
consider the “limited geographic boundaries of the ‘area’ or ‘neighborhood’ 
being evaluated.”87 
The courts have reached little consensus, however, regarding the second 
and third questions about the meaning of a “high-crime area.” With respect to 
the second question—temporal horizon—courts tend to ignore how far back in 
time the relevant crimes were that form the basis of an officer’s judgment that 
an area is high crime. A few courts have demanded “temporal proximity” 
between the evidence of past crime and the “date of the stop” at issue.88 But that 
demand, on its own, provides little guidance. And other courts appear 
comfortable relying on relatively old data.89 Thus, courts have offered little 
clarity about how far back in time officers should look in assessing whether an 
area is high crime. 
With respect to the third question—which concerns the kinds of crimes that 
are relevant—a few courts have suggested that greater weight should be given to 
crimes that are similar to the suspected crime that initially justified the stop. The 
First Circuit, for example, gives greater weight to data that establishes a “nexus 
between the type of crime most prevalent or common in the area and the type of 
crime suspected in the instant case.”90 Other courts, however, appear to reject 
any nexus requirement. In United States v. Cooper, for example, a police officer 
stopped an individual on the street suspected of car theft. The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the area where the stop took place was high crime even though 
there was no evidence that “car thefts occurred in [the] area with ‘unusual 
 
 85. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2000). Some police 
departments agree. For example, at some point after our data in this study end, the NYPD amended its 
investigation guide to state: “[A] ‘high crime area’ cannot be defined too broadly, such as encompassing 
an entire precinct or borough.” NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, INVESTIGATIVE GUIDE 15 (2015). 
 86. United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 87. United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Hill, 752 
F.3d 1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 2014) (“This vague testimony about the ‘overall’ rise in crime in the ‘fairly 
large county’ tells us almost nothing about whether the police had reasonable suspicion to seize Hill at 
one single apartment complex, in one single town within the county.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Wright, 485 F.3d at 53–54. 
 89. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“One agent said he’d been 
involved in 15–20 stops over eight and a half years, and ‘[could]n’t recall any . . . where we didn’t have 
a violation of some sort.’ . . . The other agent testified to ‘about a dozen’ stops in the same period, all 
but one of which led to an arrest. . . . Without hesitation, the majority treats this as a crime wave, but is 
it really? Does an arrest every four months or so make for a high crime area?”). 
 90. Wright, 485 F.3d at 53–54. A few other courts have taken care to note that the area in which 
a stop took place has a high rate of the suspected crime. See, e.g., Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 468 
(“Furthermore, the crimes that frequently occur in the area are specific and related to the reason for 
which Caruthers was stopped.”). 
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regularity.’”91 Consistent with Cooper, courts frequently conclude that an area is 
high crime without any information about the frequency of the specific crime 
suspected by the officer.92 
2. Evidence of High-Crime Areas 
In addition to leaving open the substantive definition of a high-crime area, 
Wardlow also provided no guidance on the relevant evidentiary standards. In 
response, the courts have been remarkably lax, accepting a variety of different 
kinds of evidence to support the government’s claim that an area satisfies the 
high-crime standard.93 The most common approach is to accept an officer’s bare 
testimony that an area is “high crime.”94 Indeed, courts frequently defer to such 
testimony without any additional information.95 In some cases, officers may 
provide slightly more information about the basis of their subjective judgment. 
They might, for example, explain that their judgment is based on the number of 
arrests they have conducted in the area or on the high volume of civilian 
complaints received by the department.96 When doing so, officers rarely specify 
 
 91. United States v. Cooper, 431 F. App’x 399, 403 (6th Cir. 2011) (Cole, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 92. See infra note 95. 
 93. For a more extensive review of the case law, see Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 4, at 
1607–18. 
 94. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 4, at 1607 (“[T]he majority of jurisdictions . . . primarily 
have relied on an officer’s testimony that an area is a ‘high-crime area’ without much analysis as to the 
basis of that conclusion.”); see also Herbert, supra note 7, at 135 (“As an eager young Assistant United 
States Attorney who ‘papered’ countless complaints, conducted numerous hearings and tried a 
substantial number of cases, I learned how to decode police officer jargon and law enforcement 
terminology. One of the most commonly used—yet seldom defined—phrases was ‘high crime 
area.’ . . . In court . . . judges rarely challenged the label or required its definition. Judges never asked 
officers for data to support assertions that an area was high-crime.”). 
 95. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 4, at 1607; Herbert, supra note 7, at 135; see, e.g., State 
v. Morgan, 539 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Wis. 1995) (“[W]e find that an officer’s perception of an area as 
‘high-crime’ can be a factor justifying a search.”); Riley v. Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d 724, 726 (Va. 
Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that the officer testified that the stop took place in a “high crime area”); 
United States v. Reed, 402 F. App’x 413, 416 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Wiley, 117 F. 
App’x 906, 908 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The officers testified that the restaurant was located in a high-crime 
area.”); State v. Moyer, No. 09AP–434, 2009 WL 4936383, at *1(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (“At 
the hearing, the state presented Officer Harmon, who testified his encounter with defendant occurred in 
what is a ‘known high-crime area’ where narcotics and weapons arrests are common.”); United States 
v. Bryant, No. 1:16CR060, 2017 WL 1086081, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2017) (“The location of the 
market itself was identified by CPD and was testified to by Officer Rogers as a high-crime area.”); 
United States v. Singleton, No. CRIM. 3:07CR282, 2008 WL 2323487, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 29, 2008) 
(“In the present case, the officers testified that they observed the Defendant walking in a high-crime area 
with a handgun in a holster at his side.”); State v. Sanders, No. 01-0927, 2002 WL 1757659, at *2 (Iowa 
Ct. App. July 31, 2002) (“[T]he officer testified the two were standing behind an abandoned house in 
a high-crime area in Des Moines notorious for drug dealing, prostitution, loitering, and vandalism.”). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Bridges, No. 14-20007, 2014 WL 1365673, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 
Apr. 7, 2014) (“Defendant was in a specific intersection that is a known high-crime area, where Corporal 
Neese has made previous arrests for firearms offenses, drug crimes, and other offenses.”); Lee v. State, 
868 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[The officer] had made fifteen to twenty drug arrests at 
[the site of the stop].”); State v. Collins, 890 So. 2d 616, 619 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that the police 
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the precise geographic area or time period from which their experience is 
drawn.97 
A few courts have demanded more rigorous and objective evidence before 
concluding that an area is high crime.98 In Montero-Camargo, for example, the 
Ninth Circuit instructed the district courts that calling an area high crime 
“requires careful examination.”99 It explained that courts “must carefully 
examine the testimony of police officers . . . and make a fair and forthright 
evaluation of the evidence they offer.”100 The court further noted that “more than 
mere war stories are required to establish the existence of a high-crime 
area . . . [and] courts should examine with care the specific data underlying any 
such assertion.”101 
Despite calling for more careful scrutiny of officers’ testimony, not even 
the Ninth Circuit has always followed its own instructions. As the concurrence 
in Montero-Camargo pointed out, the majority opinion itself failed to scrutinize 
 
department “received frequent complaints about crime in the vicinity of [the stop].”); United States v. 
Coates, 457 F. Supp. 2d 563, 568 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (“Detective Redpath testified that 
Lawrenceville . . . is a high crime area where he and his unit have made numerous drug arrests.”); State 
v. Serna, 307 P.3d 82, 83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013), (“Officers described the area as ‘high crime,’ a ‘gang 
neighborhood’ where ‘violence takes place,’ and having ‘numerous drug complaints.’”); United States 
v. Amaker, No. CRIM 2:05-00149-001, 2005 WL 3409570, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 12, 2005) 
(“Patrolman Workman testified that the subject area was a high crime area and that, in his seven plus 
years as an officer, he had made numerous arrests in the area.”); Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. 2618 
EDA 2014, 2015 WL 6112184, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2015) (“Officer Walsh further stated that 
he had personal experience with the high rate of crime in the arrest area, having previously made 
‘between 25 and 50 arrests’ in the immediate area.”); Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Del. 2001) 
(“Officer Jordan testified the area was a high crime area and that the police had had numerous complaints 
of drug dealing and other criminal activity.”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Evidence on these issues 
could include a mix of objective data and the testimony of police officers, describing their experiences 
in the area.”). 
 99. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); see also N. 
Mariana Islands v. Crisostomo, No. 2013-SCC-0008-CRM, 2014 WL 7072149, at *3 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 
12, 2014) (“[W]e conclude that an officer’s sense of an area’s criminality by itself is not enough to 
support a high-crime-area finding. Instead, the Commonwealth must provide objective, verifiable data 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the arrest, the disputed location had a 
higher crime rate than other relevant areas in a constitutionally significant manner.”); United States v. 
Arvizu, 232 F.3d 1241, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 534 U.S. 266 (2002)) (rejecting the district court’s 
finding that an area was high crime because the only supporting evidence in the record was an officer’s 
testimony that the “400 block was ‘one of the most notorious areas’” for smuggling drugs and 
undocumented immigrants); People v. Harris, 957 N.E.2d 930, 936 (Ill. App. 1. Dist. 2011) (“A 
conclusory and unsubstantiated statement that a location is a ‘high crime area’ is insufficient to establish 
that consideration for purposes of a Terry stop.”). 
 100. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138. 
 101. Id. at 1139 n.32 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Thornton, No. 5:13CR522, 2014 
WL 11173589, at *7 n.1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2014) (“At the evidentiary hearing, the government 
provided the Court with . . . a printout of reported crimes within a one mile radius around the intersection 
of Copley Road and South Hawkins.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379361 
2019] THE END OF INTUITION-BASED HIGH-CRIME AREAS 367 
the underlying data.102 Other subsequent Ninth Circuit panels have done the 
same. One panel accepted that an area was high crime based on one officer’s 
unsupported testimony that “in [his] experience as a patrol officer[,] . . . Harbor 
Boulevard in the vicinity of McFadden Boulevard is an area of heavy narcotics 
trafficking and other criminal activity.”103 Another panel was criticized by a 
dissenting judge for accepting the lower court’s judgment that an area was high 
crime even though that judgment was based exclusively on the testimony of an 
officer that a particular road was “located in a high-crime area.”104 Thus, even 
courts that demand more rigorous scrutiny of officers’ testimony often fail to 
conduct that scrutiny themselves. 
* * * 
Given the state of the case law, it’s hard to draw clear generalizations about 
Wardlow and the concept of a high-crime area. The most common approach 
appears to be for courts to defer to the largely unsupported testimony of police 
officers that a particular area is high crime. As a result, courts rarely grapple with 
the three key questions left open by Wardlow concerning the geographic scope, 
temporal horizon, and categories of crimes most relevant to the analysis. But 
when the courts do scrutinize officers’ testimony carefully, they appear to 
analyze high-crime areas through a relatively narrow geographic lens. A high-
crime area appears, therefore, to be more like a street block or intersection than 
a neighborhood or county. It’s less clear what temporal horizon or categories of 
crime should be considered. 
C. Wardlow’s Unspoken Empirical Assumptions 
Based on our reading of the case law, we believe the wisdom of Wardlow 
as a constitutional doctrine depends heavily on at least three unspoken empirical 
assumptions about how police officers apply the high-crime area standard in 
practice. 
The first concerns the geographic scope of a high-crime area. As we noted 
above, the few lower courts that have grappled with this question generally agree 
that officers must analyze whether an area is high crime through a granular lens: 
 
 102. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“The opinion recognizes 
the danger in allowing the police to characterize an area as ‘high-crime’ to establish a basis for 
reasonable suspicion, but then proceeds to do just that, based on nothing more than the personal 
experiences of two arresting agents. As I discuss above, the agents didn’t even claim this was a high 
crime area . . . . To [my colleagues], it’s a high crime area, because the officers say it’s a high crime 
area.”). 
 103. United States v. Sandoval, 131 F. App’x 614, 615–16 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“While the district 
court may not have ‘examine[d] with care the specific data underlying’ this assertion, we conclude that 
Officer Stys was still entitled to give this factor some weight in forming reasonable suspicion.”) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1139 n.32). 
 104. United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that testimony claiming a certain road “was located in a high crime area” without evidence to 
support the officers’ observation “was a far cry from the ‘specific data’ required to support the assertion 
that the stop took place in a ‘high crime’ area.”). 
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something more like a street block or intersection or cluster of street blocks rather 
than a neighborhood or city.105 
The second assumption is that officers’ assessments of high-crime areas are 
relatively accurate. There are good reasons to question that assumption. For one 
thing, officers may not be aware of crime rates everywhere in the city, 
particularly if they are expected to analyze whether an area is high crime at a low 
geographic level, such as an individual intersection or street block.106 
Bureaucratic incentives might also skew officers’ assessments of high-
crime areas. From 2002 until at least 2011, NYPD officers had significant 
professional incentives to increase the number of stops they conducted.107 These 
incentives may have led some officers to conduct stops even when they lacked 
reasonable suspicion, and, to justify those stops, they may have invoked high-
crime area in locations that were not high crime.108 
An officer’s intuition about whether an area is high crime may also be 
biased by legally suspect variables.109 To begin with, officers might be 
influenced by the suspect’s race. Prior empirical work has documented that, 
among suspects stopped by the police, people of color are more likely than 
whites to be arrested.110 The process by which officers form suspicion about 
Black and white suspects might also differ. One particularly relevant study 
followed police officers in Savannah, Georgia, and observed the process by 
which they developed suspicion about pedestrians and motorists.111 The authors 
found that, among the people the officers suspected of possible criminal 
behavior, suspicion of Black suspects was four times more likely than suspicion 
of white suspects to be based on “[n]onbehavioral” or contextual factors, such as 
“appearance, . . . time, and place.”112 These results suggest that officers may be 
 
 105. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
 106. See DEREK J. PAULSEN & MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, CRIME MAPPING AND SPATIAL 
ASPECTS OF CRIME 38 (2d ed. 2004) (reviewing the empirical literature on police perceptions of the 
geographic distribution of crime and noting that “researchers have studied the spatial perceptions of 
police officers as they relate to crime patterns within a city and found that they . . . are incorrect”). 
 107. See Floyd v. New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 591–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (documenting live 
testimony, depositions, roll call recordings, internal NYPD documents, and survey results, and 
concluding that the “most plausible explanation” for a 700 percent increase in stops from 2002 to 2011 
was “significant pressure” on police officers “to increase their stop activity”). 
 108. See Fagan & Geller, supra note 23, at 69–81 (showing patterns in the circumstances that 
police officers invoke to establish reasonable suspicion in stop and frisk activities). 
 109. For a recent general discussion of implicit bias related to stop and frisk, see L. Song 
Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 73, 75–78 (2017). 
 110. See Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of Suspect 
Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 486–90 (2011) (conducting a meta-analysis 
of twenty-seven independent datasets and finding that people of color are arrested more frequently than 
white people). 
 111. Geoffrey P. Alpert, John M. MacDonald & Roger G. Dunham, Police Suspicion and 
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 418 (2005). 
 112. Id. at 419 (“Behavioral criteria included specific actions by citizens that were either illegal 
or interpreted by the officer as suspicious. One example is observing a traffic offense. Obviously, not all 
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more likely to rely on softer contextual factors, including local crime rates, in 
forming suspicion about people of color than about white people. 
Officers’ high-crime assessments might also be unduly influenced by the 
racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic composition of the surrounding neighborhood. 
As the concurrence observed in Montero-Camargo, the concept of a high-crime 
area “can easily serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity.”113 Indeed, bias among 
officers might lead them to consciously or subconsciously believe that people of 
color are more likely to commit crime, and thus, to perceive that communities of 
color have higher crime rates.114 Several prior empirical studies lend some 
support to this hypothesis. One study found a positive correlation between the 
proportion of young Black men in a neighborhood and residents’ perceptions of 
neighborhood crime, even after controlling for official crime rates.115 A second 
paper found that measures of neighborhood race and poverty are stronger 
predictors of residents’ perceptions of disorder than actual disorder itself.116 That 
finding is particularly important for police departments like the NYPD, which 
has heavily emphasized order-maintenance policing.117 One additional study in 
New York City found that measures of the racial and socioeconomic composition 
of an area were stronger predictors of the number of police stops in that area than 
measures of physical and social disorder.118 This body of empirical work 
suggests that the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of a neighborhood may 
influence a police officer’s assessment of whether an area is high crime. 
Furthermore, given the highly discretionary nature of the high-crime 
inquiry, any two given officers might disagree about whether a particular level 
of crime qualifies as high. Thus, an officer’s high-crime area assessment might 
 
police officers stop all traffic violators, but an observed traffic violation justifies an officer making a 
stop. Nonbehavioral criteria included officer concern about an individual’s appearance, the time and 
place, and descriptive information provided to an officer.”). 
 113. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). 
 114. See B. Michelle Peruche & E. Ashby Plant, The Correlates of Law Enforcement Officers’ 
Automatic and Controlled Race-Based Responses to Criminal Suspects, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 193, 193–94 (2006) (discussing the theoretical and empirical literature on implicit racial bias 
and policing). 
 115. Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial 
Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 717–18 (2001); see also 
George F. Rengert & William V. Pelfrey, Jr., Cognitive Mapping of the City Center: Comparative 
Perceptions of Dangerous Places, in CRIME MAPPING AND CRIME PREVENTION: CRIME PREVENTION 
STUDIES 213–15 (D. Weisburd & T. McEwan eds., 1997) (finding a negative correlation between 
perceived safety and concentration of ethnic minorities). 
 116. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and 
the Social Construction of “Broken Windows”, 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 319 (2004) (reporting based 
on data from Chicago, Seattle, and Baltimore that “[o]bserved disorder predicts perceived disorder, but 
racial and economic context matter [sic] more”). 
 117. See supra note 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 118. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and 
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 463–64 (2000); id. at 484–87 (describing 
measures of disorder). 
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also be influenced by inter-officer differences in perception of what qualifies as 
“high-crime.” We have found little empirical research on such disparities among 
the police, but one study surveyed residents in Baltimore in the 1980s and 1990s 
about their perceptions of physical and social disorder in their neighborhoods.119 
The author found that residents’ perceptions of disorder varied widely, even 
among residents living in the same neighborhood.120 Police officers’ assessments 
of crime and disorder may be subject to the same disparities. 
Wardlow’s third empirical assumption concerns predictive power. In 
justifying investigative stops, a police officer must be able to articulate specific 
facts that together form a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was engaged in 
or was about to engage in crime. For courts to accept “high-crime area” as a basis 
of reasonable suspicion, the officer’s determination that an area is high crime 
should predict whether suspects are, on average, engaged in crime. Wardlow thus 
assumes that, controlling for other stated bases of reasonable suspicion, there is 
a higher probability that a suspect is engaged in a crime where the officer invokes 
high-crime area as a basis of the stop. 
Over fifteen years have passed since the Supreme Court issued Wardlow, 
and yet we still know almost nothing about how officers apply the high-crime 
area standard. We therefore don’t know if any of its empirical assumptions are 
satisfied in practice. In the remainder of this Article, we attempt to test those 
assumptions. 
III. 
DATA 
Our dataset contains information on 2,455,030 stops conducted by the 
NYPD between 2007 and 2012.121 The data derive from the Stop, Question and 
Frisk Report Worksheet, more commonly referred to as the UF-250. Officers 
must fill out the Worksheet after every stop they conduct.122 The form collects a 
range of information, including the suspected crime; the suspect’s race, gender, 
 
 119. RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS: BALTIMORE 
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GRIME, FEAR, AND DECLINE 164–
69 (2001). 
 120. Id. 
 121. The original dataset also included data from 2004 to 2005. We dropped all stops from those 
years because we were unable to geocode a large proportion of stops due to data quality issues. We also 
dropped all stops classified as “radio runs” because, in those cases, the officer is searching for a specific 
person who matches a suspect description, usually from a recent crime in the surrounding area. 
 122. It is possible some officers did not always fill out a stop form for stops resulting in an arrest. 
However, we suspect this practice was rare given the intense bureaucratic pressure to file paperwork to 
demonstrate officer productivity in both stops and arrests. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
The New York State Attorney General conducted an analysis of arrests resulting from stops from 2009 
to 2012. Of the 150,330 arrest records received, just 5 percent had no corresponding stop information. 
See ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, A REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 7 (2013), 
at https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_NOV_2013.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/QA57-M2VY] (finding 142,596 records for 150,330 arrests). 
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and age; whether the stop resulted in the recovery of weapons, drugs, or other 
contraband; and whether the suspect was arrested or issued a citation. Most 
important for our purposes, the form also requires officers to identify the 
circumstances which led to the stop—that is, the bases of reasonable suspicion—
by checking off a series of boxes, including a box for high-crime areas.123 
The Worksheet also collects information on the police precinct and street 
address where the stop took place. We used this information to geocode the stops 
to each of the 2,211 census tracts and 5,722 block groups in New York City from 
the 2000 census.124 We dropped 185,967 stops (5 percent) that we were unable 
to geocode. 
We also obtained criminal-complaint data from the NYPD on each of the 
4.6 million crimes reported to the department from 2004 to 2012. We geocoded 
the complaints to block groups125 and then merged various lagged measures of 
crime with our stop data. 
Finally, we obtained data on block groups in New York City from the 
American Community Survey 2005–2009 (ACS). Specifically, we obtained 
measures of the racial and socioeconomic composition of residents in each area.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics concerning the characteristics of each 
of the stops in our data. Blacks are disproportionately represented. Indeed, 
roughly 55 percent of civilians stopped were non-Hispanic Black, while that 
group made up less than a quarter of the city’s population.126 Roughly 31 percent 
of civilians stopped were Hispanic, while that group made up about 28 percent 
of the city.127 Roughly 93 percent were male. Stopped civilians were, on average, 
28 years old. Stops rarely resulted in “hits.” Indeed, officers recovered a weapon 
in 1 percent of stops and other contraband in another 2 percent. Stops resulted in 
an arrest just 7 percent of the time. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the characteristics of the areas in 
which stops were conducted. We denote precinct-level measures with the 
abbreviation “PCT” and block group-level measures with “BG.” Stops occurred 
 
 123. N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, STOP, QUESTION AND FRISK REPORT WORKSHEET (2011), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/686450/stop-question-and-frisk-report-worksheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EA76-7C9G]. The full list of circumstances includes: (1) suspicious bulge; (2) casing 
a victim or location; (3) carrying objects used in commission of crime; (4) wearing clothing/disguises 
used in commission of crime; (5) suspect fits description; (6) visible drug transaction; (7) furtive 
movements; (8) acting as lookout; and (9) visible violent crime. The form also provides additional check 
boxes labeled as “additional” circumstances: (1) association with known criminals; (2) change of 
direction upon seeing police; (3) evasive actions; (4) high incidence of reported offense; (5) part of 
ongoing investigation; (6) proximity to crime; (7) report of victim or witness; (8) sights and sounds of 
crime; and (9) time of day. Id. Finally, the worksheet provides space for officers to identify “Other 
Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity” in their own words. Id. 
 124. We are grateful to Matt Ruther for his exceptional work geocoding the data. 
 125. We were unable to code the census tract and block group of 204,923 criminal complaints (4 
percent). 
 126. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 60. 
 127. Id. 
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in block groups that were, on average, 28 percent white, 40 percent Black, and 
36 percent Hispanic. As those averages suggest, stops are concentrated in 
communities of color. Roughly 40 percent of all stops occurred in block groups 
that were majority Black and another 30 percent took place in block groups that 
were majority Hispanic. 
Officers also tended to stop civilians in economically disadvantaged areas 
of the city. On average, stops occurred in block groups in which 30 percent of 
households received an annual income of less than $20,000; 55 percent of 
households were single-headed; and 25 percent of households lived below the 
national poverty line. 
 
Table 1. Stop Characteristics128 
  Mean SD Minimum Maximum N 
Demographics           
  Black Non-Hispanic 0.55 0.50 0 1 2,455,030 
  Black Hispanic 0.07 0.25 0 1 2,455,030 
  White Non-Hispanic 0.09 0.28 0 1 2,455,030 
  White Hispanic 0.24 0.43 0 1 2,455,030 
  Other Race 0.06 0.24 0 1 2,455,030 
  Male 0.93 0.25 0 1 2,455,030 
  Age 28.1 11.5 8 99 1,963,208 
Suspected Crime           
  Violent 0.20 0.40 0 1 2,455,030 
  Property 0.22 0.41 0 1 2,455,030 
  Weapon 0.29 0.45 0 1 2,455,030 
  Drug 0.11 0.31 0 1 2,455,030 
  Trespass 0.11 0.31 0 1 2,455,030 
  Quality of Life 0.02 0.13 0 1 2,455,030 
  Other Crime 0.07 0.25 0 1 2,455,030 
Bases of Suspicion           
  Suspicious Bulge 0.10 0.30 0 1 2,455,030 
  Casing 0.31 0.46 0 1 2,455,030 
  Clothes 0.05 0.21 0 1 2,455,030 
  Suspect Description 0.12 0.33 0 1 2,455,030 
  Drug Transaction 0.10 0.30 0 1 2,455,030 
  Furtive Movements 0.51 0.50 0 1 2,455,030 
  Lookout 0.17 0.38 0 1 2,455,030 
  Criminal Object 0.03 0.16 0 1 2,455,030 
  Violent Crime 0.09 0.29 0 1 2,455,030 
  Criminal Associates 0.04 0.20 0 1 2,455,030 
  Change Direction 0.26 0.44 0 1 2,455,030 
  Evasive Behavior 0.21 0.41 0 1 2,455,030 
  High Crime 0.59 0.49 0 1 2,455,030 
  Ongoing Investigation 0.13 0.34 0 1 2,455,030 
  Proximity to Crime 0.19 0.39 0 1 2,455,030 
  Witness Report 0.09 0.28 0 1 2,455,030 
  Sights/Sounds of Crime    0.02 0.14 0 1 2,455,030 
  Time 0.41 0.49 0 1 2,455,030 
Stop Outcomes           
  Weapon Found 0.01 0.11 0 1 2,455,030 
  Other Contraband Found 0.02 0.14 0 1 2,455,030 
  Arrest Made 0.07 0.25 0 1 2,455,030 
 
 
 128. When totaled together, suspected crimes exceed 100 percent due to rounding. 
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To avoid the risk of overfitting, we randomly partitioned the data into a 
training dataset and a testing dataset.129 The training dataset consists of one-third 
of all stops, and the testing dataset consists of the remaining two-thirds. All of 
the results we report in the following sections are based on the testing dataset. 
 
Table 2. Social and Crime Characteristics of Stop Areas130 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum N 
Crime           
  PCT Viol Index Crime 12mo 1,801.4 908.2 204.0 4,468.0 2,455,030 
  PCT Prop Index Crime 12mo 2,221.8 1,078.9 471.0 8,172.0 2,455,030 
  BG Viol Index Crime 12mo 41.5 33.2 0.0 296.0 2,455,009 
  BG Prop Index Crime 12mo 52.5 112.9 0.0 2,365.0 2,455,009 
Racial/Ethnic Composition           
  BG White 0.28 0.27 0 1 2,408,576 
  BG Black 0.40 0.32 0 1 2,408,576 
  BG Hispanic 0.36 0.27 0 1 2,408,576 
Socioeconomic Characteristics           
  BG No HS Graduation 0.29 0.17 0 1 2,407,049 
  BG Income $20k-50k 0.30 0.13 0 1 2,402,373 
  BG Income $50k-125k 0.28 0.16 0 1 2,402,373 
  BG Income >$125k 0.09 0.13 0 1 2,402,373 
  BG Median Income 41,604 28,589 2,499 250,001 2,388,340 
  BG Families in Poverty 0.25 0.19 0.00 1 2,375,101 
  BG Assistance 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.70 2,402,373 
  BG Vacant Properties 0.09 0.10 0.00 1 2,404,982 
  BG Single-headed Household 0.55 0.25 0.00 1 2,375,101 
IV. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Our empirical analysis unfolds in two steps. As noted, Wardlow and other 
subsequent cases have left open many questions about the definition of a high-
crime area. We therefore have little information about how officers interpret and 
apply the high-crime area standard—about the geographic scope and temporal 
horizon they use to evaluate whether an area is high crime and about the kinds 
of crimes they consider most relevant. In the first stage of our analysis, we seek 
to answer some of these questions by identifying a model of crime that best 
predicts when officers invoke the high-crime area standard to justify their stops. 
Admittedly, our answers are necessarily rough. The dataset contains stops 
conducted by almost 20,000 unique officers, each of whom may apply the high-
 
 129. See RICHARD A. BERK, STATISTICAL LEARNING FROM A REGRESSION PERSPECTIVE 31–
35 (2d ed. 2016). 
 130. We obtained crime data from the NYPD. Racial and socioeconomic variables derive from 
the American Community Survey, 2005–2009 and are constant for all years in the data. Block group-
level 2009 5-year ACS data on New York City can be obtained from socialexplorer.com. PCT refers to 
police precinct. BG refers to census block group. Index crimes are groupings commonly used in crime 
reporting that were developed by the FBI. Violent Index Crimes include Murder, Armed Robbery, 
Aggravated Assault, and Forcible Rape. Property Index Crimes include Burglary, Larceny, Motor 
Vehicle Theft, and Arson. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2017, available 
at https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/violent-crime 
[https://perma.cc/59UM-4A8A]. 
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crime area standard differently. Our goal, however, is to find models of crime 
that best fit the data with the hopes of gaining insight about the behavior of the 
typical officer. In the second stage of our analysis, we then use these models to 
evaluate Wardlow and test its empirical assumptions. 
A. Modeling Crime Rates on Officers’ Invocation of HCA 
To identify a model of crime that best predicts when officers invoke the 
high-crime area standard, we fit a series of models regressing whether the officer 
invoked HCA as a basis of suspicion on a variety of different measures of crime. 
For ease of interpretation, we primarily report results from linear probability 
models.131 We are particularly interested in each model’s R2, which measures 
how well each model fits the data on a scale from 0 to 1. We therefore report 
both the R2 from the linear probability model and the McFadden’s R2 from the 
corresponding logit, the latter of which better fits the binary structure of the 
dependent variable.132 Throughout the Article, we report cluster-robust standard 
errors clustered at the officer and block group-level. Our threshold for statistical 
significance is the 0.05 level, but our tables also report when coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level. 
Our first step is to examine, in broad categories, the kinds of crimes police 
officers appear to care about most in assessing whether an area is high crime. We 
begin by fitting a linear model with just one independent variable—the number 
of crimes in the past twelve months in the police precinct in which the stop took 
place. In Table 3, Model 1 shows the results when the independent variable 
measures total crime, Model 2 shows the results for violent crime, and Model 3 
shows the results for property crime. To reduce the number of digits displayed 
after the decimal, we have divided each of the crime variables by 100 for all of 
the models presented in the remainder of the Article. 
None of the models in Table 1 strongly predict whether an officer invokes 
HCA, but violent crime appears to be the strongest predictor. The McFadden’s 
R2 for the violent-crime model is .001, which is substantially larger than that of 
the total (.0001) and property-crime models (.0002). On the whole, in assessing 
whether an area is high crime, officers appear to focus more on violence than 
property offenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 131. The logit models produced substantively similar results. Unfortunately, we were unable to 
fit logits for models with fixed effects for officers due to the computational difficulty of calculating over 
20,000 fixed effects with cluster-robust standard errors. 
 132. See Paul Allison, What’s the Best R-Squared for Logistic Regression?, STAT. HORIZONS 
(Feb. 13, 2013), https://statisticalhorizons.com/r2logistic [https://perma.cc/9VBV-E27V] (describing 
different measures of fit for logit models and endorsing McFadden’s R2). 
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Table 3. Modeling HCA on Violent and Property Crime in the Last 12 Months 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
  Intercept 0.5701** 0.5523**  0.6054** 
  [0.0127] [0.0109] [0.0110] 
  PCT Total  0.0002     
  [0.0001]     
  PCT Violent   0.0019**   
    [0.0005]   
  PCT Property     -0.0008† 
      [0.0004] 
Adjusted R^2 (LPM) 0.0002 0.0013 0.0003 
McFadden's R^2 (Logit) 0.0001 0.0009 0.0002 
N 1,636,384 1,636,384 1,636,384 
Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
To make things more concrete, Figure 1 depicts the relationship between 
HCA and precinct-level violent crime. The black curve displays the best-fit line, 
which is nearly flat but suggests officers invoke HCA just slightly more often as 
violent crime increases. The gray line, which represents a local linear smoother, 
tells a similar story. For nearly the entire distribution—from roughly 500 to 
3,300 crimes on the X-axis—the rate at which officers invoke HCA remains 
roughly stable, confirming that there is little correlation between HCA and crime 
levels. The slope of the curve only steepens above roughly 3,300 crimes. 
Importantly, we should be cautious in interpreting the right-hand side of the 
graph. The bottom of the graph contains a rug, which illustrates the number of 
observations located along the X-axis. As the rug shows, there are almost no 
observations between 3,300 and 3,900 crimes. All observations above 3,900 
arise from just one precinct in Brooklyn—the 74th. Thus, the entire rise in the 
HCA invocation rate above 3,300 is due to just one precinct in the city.133 
 
 
 133. The undue leverage of outliers can skew the estimate of a statistical relationship between 
variables. Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over 
Again, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 305–06 (2005). 
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Figure 1. HCA on Precinct-Level Violent Crime in Previous 12 Months 
 
Having found that officers appear to prioritize violent crime over property 
crime in assessing HCA, we next turn to the question of geographic scope. Recall 
that police precincts cover, on average, four square miles and that census block 
groups cover 0.05 square miles. The first model in Table 4 replicates our most 
predictive model in the previous table, which regresses HCA on precinct-level 
(denoted by the abbreviation “PCT”) violent crime in the last twelve months. 
Model 2 regresses HCA on block group-level (denoted by “BG”) violent crime 
in the last twelve months, and finds a positive and statistically significant 
correlation. Once again, to make things more concrete, Figure 2 depicts the 
relationship between HCA and block group-level violent crime from Model 2. 
As before, the black curve displays the best-fit line, which is nearly flat but 
suggests officers invoke HCA just slightly more often as violent crime increases. 
The gray line moves up and down across the X-axis slightly, but remains 
relatively flat over all. The McFadden’s R2 for the block group-level model is 
substantially smaller than that of the precinct-level model, suggesting that 
precinct-level measures of crime are better predictors of HCA than block group-
level measures. 
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Figure 2. HCA on Block Group-Level Violent Crime in Previous 12 Months 
 
Model 3 combines both the precinct-level and block group-level variables 
together.134 The coefficient on the precinct-level measure remains roughly the 
same and statistically significant, while the coefficient for the block group-level 
measure drops by about a third and is no longer statistically significant. Based 
on the models’ respective R2, precinct-level violent crime appears to be the 
strongest predictor of HCA. Though, the R2 increases slightly when we include 
both the precinct and block group-level measures. 
 
Table 4. Modeling HCA on Different Geographic Scopes 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
  Intercept 0.5523** 0.5748** 0.5462** 
  [0.0109] [0.0059] [0.0102] 
  PCT Violent 0.0019**   0.0018** 
  [0.0005]   [0.0005] 
  BG Violent   0.0294* 0.0206 
    [0.0139] [0.0139] 
Adjusted R^2 (LPM) 0.0013 0.0004 0.0014 
McFadden's R^2 (Logit) 0.0009 0.0003 0.0011 
N 1,636,384 1,636,367 1,636,367 
Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
 
 134. One might reasonably wonder whether modeling violent crime at both the precinct and 
block group-level in Model 3 introduces high levels of multi-collinearity. However, the Pearson 
correlation between these two variables is just 0.17 and the standard errors for each coefficient do not 
change. The low correlation suggests that there may be different data-generating processes at work in 
the precinct versus block-group decisions to invoke HCA. 
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We next consider temporal scope. Table 5 depicts four models regressing 
HCA on measures of violent crime with different time spans: 1 month, 3 months, 
12 months, and 24 months. McFadden’s R2 shows that the variation explained 
by the models increases as the temporal scope expands from 1 to 12 months. 
However, it maxes out at 12 months, as the 24-month measures do not explain 
additional variation. These patterns suggest that an officer’s decision to invoke 
HCA to justify a stop is generally based on crimes that occurred in the last 12 
months.135 
 
Table 5. Modeling HCA on Different Temporal Horizons 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 
  Intercept 0.5567** 0.5529** 0.5462** 0.5460** 
  [0.0091] [0.0095] [0.0102] [0.0104] 
  PCT Violent 1mo 0.0180**       
  [0.0055]       
  BG Violent 1mo 0.1174       
  [0.0966]       
  PCT Violent 3mo   0.0063**     
    [0.0020]     
  BG Violent 3mo   0.0604     
    [0.0463]     
  PCT Violent 12mo     0.0018**   
      [0.0005]   
  BG Violent 12mo     0.0206   
      [0.0139]   
  PCT Violent 24mo       0.0009** 
        [0.0003] 
  BG Violent 24mo       0.0099 
        [0.0071] 
Adjusted R^2 (LPM) 0.001 0.0012 0.0014 0.0014 
McFadden's R^2 (Logit) 0.0008 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 
N 1,636,367 1,636,367 1,636,367 1,636,367 
Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Having learned that violent crime in the past 12 months is the strongest 
predictor of how officers invoke HCA, we now return to the question of which 
specific crime categories matter most. 
Table 6 depicts a series of models with more specific crime categories. As 
a baseline, Model 1 replicates Model 3 from the previous table by including 
measures of violent crime at the precinct- and block group-level in the last twelve 
months. Model 2 uses more violent crime instead: non-negligent homicide, 
negligent homicide, assault, and robbery. McFadden’s R2 shows that this model 
explains substantially more of the variation in HCA, but we note that nearly half 
of the coefficients are negative. Adding discrete categories of property, drug, and 
weapons crimes in Model 3 further increases the variation explained by the 
model, but again, we note that twelve of the twenty coefficients are negative. 
 
 135. The variation explained does not substantially increase when we combine the 12-month 
variable with any of the other timing variables. 
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In Model 4, we removed all of the variables associated with negative 
coefficients and any additional variables that became negative thereafter. We did 
so because the purpose of our analysis in the next section is to evaluate how 
police officers invoke HCA to justify their stops. Wardlow does not permit 
officers to claim an area is high crime based on lower crime rates. We, therefore, 
removed variables with negative coefficients so those variables do not contribute 
to the R2 of our models, which we use to evaluate officers’ HCA assessments. 
For the sake of parsimony, we also removed from Model 4 any remaining 
variables that are not statistically significant or that add little explanatory power 
to the model based on McFadden’s R2. The remaining three variables are 
precinct-level non-negligent homicide, precinct-level burglary, and block group-
level arson. Together, these variables explain over a third of the variation 
explained by the full model, Model 3. 
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Table 6. Modeling HCA on Specific Crime Types in the Last 12 Months 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 
  Intercept 0.5462**  0.5522**  0.5346**  0.5239** 
  [0.0102] [0.0102] [0.0123] [0.0127] 
  PCT Violent  0.0018**       
  [0.0005]       
  PCT Neg Homicide    0.0801 -0.5705   
    [0.3835] [0.3491]   
  PCT Non-neg Homicide     0.1965**  0.1163†  0.1368** 
    [0.0648] [0.0624] [0.0506] 
  PCT Assault    -0.0014  0.0095**   
    [0.0013] [0.0018]   
  PCT Robbery    0.0047 -0.0057†   
    [0.0031] [0.0030]   
  PCT Arson      0.0105   
      [0.0300]   
  PCT Burglary       0.0192**  0.0124** 
      [0.0055] [0.0038] 
  PCT Motor Vehicle Theft      -0.0138*   
      [0.0062]   
  PCT Theft      -0.0014*   
      [0.0006]   
  PCT Drug      -0.0065**   
      [0.0011]   
  PCT Weapon      -0.0079   
      [0.0051]   
  BG Violent  0.0206       
  [0.0139]       
  BG Neg Homicide    -3.8115† -3.1249*   
    [2.0633] [1.4916]   
  BG Non-neg Homicide     0.9867**  0.6913*   
    [0.3312] [0.2775]   
  BG Assault     0.0893**  0.0839**   
    [0.0198] [0.0244]   
  BG Robbery    -0.1859** -0.0757*   
    [0.0328] [0.0366]   
  BG Arson       1.0648**  1.6380** 
      [0.2452] [0.2755] 
  BG Burglary      -0.1112†   
      [0.0624]   
  BG Motor Vehicle Theft      -0.1719*   
      [0.0805]   
  BG Theft      -0.0055   
      [0.0056]   
  BG Drug       0.0878**   
      [0.0216]   
  BG Weapon      -0.2830**   
      [0.0865]   
Adjusted R^2 (LPM) 0.0014 0.0032 0.0123 0.0045 
McFadden's R^2 (Logit) 0.0011 0.0024 0.0092 0.0034 
N 1,636,367 1,636,367 1,636,367 1,636,367 
Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Until now, we have assumed that police officers think about and apply the 
HCA standard the same way regardless of the kind of crime they believe the 
suspect is committing. To probe this issue further, we subsetted the data by 
suspected crime—violent, property, weapons, and drug crimes, which together 
account for roughly 80 percent of all stops. We then repeated each of our analytic 
steps for the full dataset on each subset. When we replicated Tables 3 through 5 
for each suspected-crime type, the results were remarkably similar: the strongest 
variables were typically precinct-level measures of violent crime within the last 
12 months. There was, however, significant variation across suspected-crime 
types when we replicated Table 6 (which identified the specific crimes that best 
predict whether an officer invokes HCA). 
Table 7 thus replicates Models 3 and 4 in Table 6 for each of the four 
suspected crime categories. Model 1 reports the results of a regression with all 
of the 12-month, precinct- and block-group measures of specific crime types on 
the subset of stops in which the officer suspected a violent crime. Model 2 reports 
the ultimate model we reached after sequentially removing all variables that were 
negative, statistically insignificant, or that added little predictive power to the 
model. Model 2 shows that the strongest predictors of whether an officer invokes 
HCA to justify stops motivated by a suspicion of violent crime is remarkably 
similar to the strongest predictors for all stops (reported in Table 6): precinct-
level non-negligent homicide, and burglary. 
Models 4, 6, and 8 show the variables with positive coefficients that most 
strongly predict whether an officer invokes HCA to justify stops in which the 
officer suspects a property, drug, and weapons offense, respectively. For 
property-crime stops, the most predictive crime measures are precinct-level 
burglary and motor vehicle theft. For drug-crime stops, the most predictive crime 
measures are block group-level drugs and arson. And for weapon-crime stops, 
the most predictive crime measures are precinct-level non-negligent homicide 
and block group-level assault and arson. 
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Table 7. Modeling HCA on Specific Crime Types, in the Past 12 Months, by 
Suspected Crime 
  Violent Property Drug Weapons 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 Mod 5 Mod 6 Mod 7 Mod 8 
  Intercept  0.501** 0.490**  0.549** 0.523**  0.587** 0.581**  0.488** 0.486** 
  [0.016] [0.014] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.007] [0.020] [0.011] 
  PCT Neg Homicide  -0.936†   -0.171   -0.235   -0.863†   
  [0.555]   [0.460]   [0.535]   [0.520]   
  PCT Non-neg Homicide   0.169* 0.268** 0.081   0.106   0.135 0.271** 
 [0.085] [0.070] [0.076]   [0.096]   [0.085] [0.067] 
  PCT Assault  0.012**    0.008**    0.008**    0.014**   
  [0.003]   [0.002]   [0.003]   [0.003]   
  PCT Robbery  0.003   -0.015**   -0.006   -0.009*   
  [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.004]   
  PCT Arson  -0.096*   -0.018   -0.044   0.064   
  [0.042]   [0.038]   [0.044]   [0.041]   
  PCT Burglary   0.017* 0.020**  0.028** 0.020** 0.009    0.023**   
  [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008]   [0.009]   
  PCT Motor Vehicle Theft  -0.014   0.007 0.017* -0.029**   -0.036**   
 [0.008]   [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]   [0.009]   
  PCT Theft  -0.002**   -0.001   0   -0.002*   
  [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   
  PCT Drug  -0.008**   -0.005**   -0.002   -0.008**   
  [0.002]   [0.001]   [0.002]   [0.001]   
  PCT Weapon  -0.005   -0.003   -0.009   -0.012†    
  [0.006]   [0.006]   [0.007]   [0.007]   
  BG Neg Homicide  -6.886**   -0.898   -1.921   -3.589   
  [1.821]   [1.735]   [2.128]   [2.499]   
  BG Non-neg Homicide  0.184   0.13   0.273    0.760*   
  [0.386]   [0.302]   [0.401]   [0.364]   
  BG Assault   0.094**   -0.009    0.068**    0.137** 0.079** 
  [0.034]   [0.024]   [0.021]   [0.028] [0.024] 
  BG Robbery   0.081†   -0.102*   -0.055   -0.043   
  [0.042]   [0.045]   [0.040]   [0.050]   
  BG Arson   0.448†    0.356†    0.729** 0.956**  0.932** 1.485** 
  [0.233]   [0.210]   [0.232] [0.263] [0.281] [0.381] 
  BG Burglary  -0.099    0.231**   -0.184*   -0.445**   
  [0.080]   [0.059]   [0.073]   [0.091]   
  BG Motor Vehicle Theft  -0.235*    0.133†   -0.225†   -0.168   
  [0.096]   [0.073]   [0.126]   [0.141]   
  BG Theft  -0.018*   -0.007**   -0.025**   -0.028*   
  [0.007]   [0.003]   [0.009]   [0.012]   
  BG Drug  -0.016   0.029    0.114** 0.120**  0.073*   
  [0.023]   [0.021]   [0.023] [0.018] [0.029]   
  BG Weapon  -0.253*   -0.274**   -0.013   -0.113   
  [0.100]   [0.103]   [0.071]   [0.086]   
Adjusted R^2 (LPM) 0.0166 0.0065 0.0143 0.0062 0.0117 0.007 0.0217 0.0084 
McFadden's R^2 (Logit) 0.0124 0.0048 0.0108 0.0046 0.0091 0.0055 0.0163 0.0063 
N 325,525 325,526 359,807 359,807 176,196 176,196 467,250 467,250 
Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Taken together, our results point towards three key conclusions. First, 
officers’ assessments of high-crime areas tend to focus most on violent crimes 
but the results do vary somewhat by suspected crime. For example, in stops for 
suspected property offenses, there is evidence officers give most weight to 
property crimes like burglary and motor-vehicle theft, and in stops for suspected 
drug crimes, there is evidence officers give most weight to drug crimes (though, 
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there is also evidence they give weight to arson, which is a difficult result to 
explain). Second, officers tend to focus on crimes that took place within the last 
twelve months. Third, officers tend to assess whether an area is high crime 
through a broad geographic lens, like precincts or neighborhoods. Though, there 
is also evidence they give less weight to block group-level measures of crime as 
well. In the following section, we apply these lessons to evaluate each of 
Wardlow’s three empirical assumptions. 
B. Evaluating Wardlow 
1. Assumption 1: What is the Geographic Scope of a High-Crime Area? 
We already have the data we need to assess Wardlow’s first empirical 
assumption, which concerns the geographic scope with which officers assess 
whether an area is high crime. Earlier in Table 4, we found that precinct-level 
measures of crime—which cover an average of four square miles—are 
substantially stronger predictors of whether an officer invokes high-crime area 
than block group-level measures of crime, which cover 0.05 square miles on 
average. This finding is consistent with officers applying the HCA standard 
primarily at a broad level of geography—like an entire police precinct or 
neighborhood. 
Still, there is evidence that officers sometimes also analyze whether an area 
is high crime at smaller levels of geography. Indeed, as we learned from Table 
7, we found that block group-level measures of crime are particularly strong 
predictors of whether an officer invokes HCA in drugs and weapons stops. 
2. Assumption 2: Are Police Officers’ Assessments Accurate? 
We next examine whether officers’ high-crime area assessments are 
accurate. If they are, they should be strongly correlated with actual crime rates. 
Before we describe those correlations, we first report basic descriptive data 
about the frequency and geographic distribution of stops in which officers invoke 
HCA. Officers invoke HCA quite frequently—in 59 percent of all stops—more 
often than any other basis of reasonable suspicion on the UF-250 form.136 And, 
while they invoke HCA more often in certain parts of the city than others, they 
do so quite frequently everywhere. Figure 3 maps the rate at which officers 
invoke HCA across New York City.137 To make them most visible, we have 
depicted in black those areas where officers invoke HCA less than 30 percent of 
the time. As the map shows, very few areas are black. Perhaps the most important 
takeaway is that officers called 98 percent of the block groups in the city high 
crime in at least 30 percent of stops conducted in those areas. In other words, 
 
 136. See supra Part III tbl.1. 
 137. The map depicts census tracts rather than block groups because census tracts are roughly 
twice as large as block groups and thus easier to depict in the figure. 
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officers are claiming that every block in New York City is high crime at one time 
or another. 
 
Figure 3. Heat Map of Percent of Stops Officers Invoke HCA, 2007-2012 
 
Turning now to the correlation between HCA and crime rates, once again, 
our earlier results shed some light. In Part IV.A, we modeled HCA on a variety 
of measures of crime that varied in terms of crime type, geographic scope, and 
temporal horizon. Across all of our models, the level of variation in HCA 
explained by a range of different measures of crime was remarkably close to 
zero. Our most predictive models had a McFadden’s R2 hovering around 0.01, 
meaning that actual crime rates explained around one percent of the variation in 
officers’ assessments of whether areas are high crime. This pattern holds 
regardless of level of geography, temporal span, and categories of crime. It also 
held when we subsetted the data by the type of suspected crime. 
If local crime rates are not the primary determinant of whether an officer 
invokes HCA as a basis of reasonable suspicion, what is? We next examine the 
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extent to which suspect demographics, the racial and socioeconomic 
characteristics of neighborhoods, and inter-officer disparities may help explain 
when and why officers invoke HCA to justify investigative stops. 
a. Suspect Characteristics 
Cognitive biases based on the demographic characteristics of the suspect 
might explain some of officers’ inaccuracy in assessing high-crime areas. To 
explore this hypothesis, we fit a series of linear probability models, regressing 
HCA on a range of suspect characteristics, including race, gender, and age, and 
on local crime measures. When we analyze all stops together, we use the 
measures of crime in Models 1 and 4 from Table 6, which best predicted whether 
an officer would invoke HCA. When we break up our analysis by suspected-
crime type, we use the crime measures from Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 in Table 7. 
We begin by analyzing all stops together. In Table 8, Model 1 and 2 regress 
HCA on our two preferred sets of crime variables and on a set of dummy 
variables indicating the type of crime suspected by the officer. Models 3 and 4 
replicate Models 1 and 2 but add variables for suspect race, ethnicity, sex, and 
age. For race and ethnicity, the comparison group is white non-Hispanic 
suspects. Both Models 3 and 4 estimate that police officers are 3 percentage 
points more likely to invoke HCA against a Black non-Hispanic suspect. They 
estimate no statistically significant difference for Black Hispanic suspects and 
for white Hispanic suspects. They also estimate that officers are almost 5 
percentage points more likely to invoke HCA against a man than a woman, and 
that they are more likely to invoke HCA against younger suspects. 
There are at least two possible explanations for these demographic 
differentials. One explanation is that areas with more young Black men have 
higher crime rates than our models account for. Another possible explanation is 
that officers who patrol areas with more young Black men have a higher 
propensity to invoke HCA. 
To test both of these theories, Models 5 and 6 add fixed effects for block 
group and officer. The coefficients for Black non-Hispanic suspects and male 
suspects both fall by more than one half but remain statistically significant. The 
models also estimate that officers are 1 percentage point more likely to invoke 
HCA against both white Hispanic suspects and Black Hispanic suspects. The 
results are the same in Models 7 and 8 where we add fixed effects that interact 
year and block group. These results support the interpretation that officers are 
invoking HCA more frequently against young men of color. 138 
 
 
 
 
 138. We also refit the model with block-group officer fixed effects. The results were 
substantively similar, although there was a substantial loss in sample size because of the number of 
officers who conducted only one stop in a given block group. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379361 
386 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:345 
Table 8. Modeling HCA on Suspect Characteristics and  
Crime in the Last 12 Months 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 Mod 5 Mod 6 Mod 7 Mod 8 
Intercept 0.5408** 0.5232**  0.5059**  0.4761**         
  [0.0104] [0.0125] [0.0125] [0.0142]         
Suspect Characteristics                 
  Black Non-Hispanic      0.0306**  0.0326**  0.0155** 0.0155** 0.0134** 0.0134** 
      [0.0075] [0.0075] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0015] 
  Black Hispanic     -0.0116 -0.007  0.0122** 0.0121** 0.0088** 0.0088** 
      [0.0090] [0.0090] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0025] [0.0020] 
  White Hispanic      0.0034  0.0056  0.0113** 0.0112** 0.0096** 0.0096** 
      [0.0069] [0.0070] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0015] 
  Other Race     -0.0252** -0.0244** -0.0009 -0.001 -0.0017 -0.0017 
      [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0026] [0.0020] 
  Male      0.0463**  0.0466**  0.0277** 0.0277** 0.0264** 0.0264** 
      [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0014] 
  Other Gender     -0.0082 -0.0055  0.0169** 0.0166** 0.0189** 0.0189** 
      [0.0071] [0.0070] [0.0039] [0.0039] [0.0038] [0.0031] 
  Age     -0.0009** -0.0008** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** 
      [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Crime                 
  PCT Violent 0.0017**   0.0014**   -0.0030**   -0.0010*   
  [0.0005]   [0.0005]   [0.0005]   [0.0005]   
  BG Violent  0.0252*   0.0151   -0.0027    0.0163†   
  [0.0119]   [0.0113]   [0.0067]   [0.0087]   
  PCT Non-neg Homicide      0.1424**    0.0679    0.0039   -0.0011 
    [0.0463]   [0.0465]   [0.0270]   [0.0154] 
  PCT Burglary    0.0115**    0.0138**   -0.0072**    0.0033* 
    [0.0035]   [0.0035]   [0.0024]   [0.0014] 
  BG Arson    1.4652**    1.2398**   -0.0769    0.1029 
    [0.2512]   [0.2313]   [0.0658]   [0.0673] 
Suspected Crime ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Officer Fixed Effect         ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
BG Fixed Effect         ✓ ✓     
BG* Year Fixed Effect             ✓ ✓ 
Adjusted R^2 (LPM) 0.0098 0.0122 0.0131 0.0152 0.4068 0.4068 0.417 0.417 
N 1,636,367 1,636,367 1,308,446 1,308,446 1,308,446 1,308,446 1,308,446 1,308,446 
Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
We next consider whether the results vary by the type of suspected crime. 
In Table 9, we reproduce Models 7 and 8 from Table 7 separately for stops where 
the officer suspected a violent, property, drug, or weapons offense. In the odd-
numbered columns, we use the precinct-level and block group-level measures of 
violent crime we have used throughout, and in the even-numbered columns we 
use the specific measures of crime that best predicted HCA for each type of 
suspected crime (from Table 7). 
As Table 9 shows, our models find that officers invoke HCA more 
frequently against males across all suspected-crime types. But the results for 
race, ethnicity, and age vary. Officers invoke HCA more often against non-
Hispanic Black suspects for violent and weapons stops but not for property and 
drug stops. They invoke HCA more often against Black Hispanic and white 
Hispanic suspects for violent-crime stops but not for others. And they invoke 
HCA more often against younger suspects for violence, property, and weapons 
stops, but not for drug stops. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379361 
2019] THE END OF INTUITION-BASED HIGH-CRIME AREAS 387 
Taken together our models suggest several conclusions. First, controlling 
for the crime categories that officers appear to weigh most heavily in their 
assessment of high-crime areas, when we analyze all stops together, we find that 
officers are more likely to invoke HCA against young Black male suspects. And 
even when we control for officer and the narrow geographic area in which the 
stop took place, officers are still significantly more likely to invoke HCA against 
young Black men. Second, the results vary somewhat when we examine the data 
by suspected-crime type. We find evidence, for example, that officers invoke 
HCA more frequently against non-Hispanic Black suspects for violent and 
weapons stops but not for property and drug stops. 
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Table 9. Modeling HCA on Suspect Characteristics, in the Last 12 Months, By 
Suspected Crime 
 Violent Property Drug Weapons 
 Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 Mod 5 Mod 6 Mod 7 Mod 8 
Suspect 
Characteristics 
  Black Non-Hispanic  0.0194**  0.0194** 0.0034 0.0034 0.0069 0.0068  0.0099*  0.0099* 
 [0.0055] [0.0055] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0055] [0.0055] [0.0042] [0.0042] 
  Black Hispanic  0.0170**  0.0170** 0.0032 0.0033 0.0081 0.0081 0.0008 0.0008 
 [0.0064] [0.0064] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0075] [0.0075] [0.0048] [0.0048] 
  White Hispanic  0.0132*  0.0132*  0.0057†  0.0057† 0.0064 0.0063 0.005 0.005 
 [0.0057] [0.0057] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0057] [0.0057] [0.0043] [0.0043] 
  Other Race -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0093 -0.0093 -0.0055 -0.0055 
 [0.0067] [0.0067] [0.0043] [0.0043] [0.0079] [0.0079] [0.0056] [0.0056] 
  Male  0.0628**  0.0628**  0.0171**  0.0171**  0.0103*  0.0103*  0.0261**  0.0261** 
 [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0037] [0.0037] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0040] [0.0040] 
  Other Gender  0.0577**  0.0577** -0.0027 -0.0027  0.0228*  0.0227*  0.0221**  0.0221** 
 [0.0097] [0.0097] [0.0092] [0.0092] [0.0116] [0.0116] [0.0068] [0.0068] 
  Age -0.0006** -0.0006**  0.0002*  0.0002† 0 0 -0.0007** -0.0007** 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Crime 
  PCT Violent -0.0003   -0.0004   -0.0023†   -0.0004   
 [0.0009]   [0.0008]   [0.0014]   [0.0008]   
  BG Violent 0.0225   -0.0115    0.0452†    0.0259*   
 [0.0223]   [0.0215]   [0.0273]   [0.0124]   
  PCT Non-neg    
  Homicide    0.0112           0.0422 
   [0.0545]           [0.0455] 
  PCT Burglary   -0.0026    0.0090†         
   [0.0052]   [0.0047]         
  PCT Motor Vehicle       0.0106         
  Theft       [0.0082]         
  
  BG Arson           -0.1347   0.0854 
           [0.2734]   [0.1988] 
  BG Drug           0.0218     
           [0.0284]     
  BG Assault                0.0371* 
               [0.0173] 
Officer Fixed Effect ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
BG* Year Fixed 
Effect ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
N 250,347 250,348 292,411 292,411 143,047 143,047 372,471 372,471 
Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
b. Neighborhood Characteristics 
Another possible explanation for the low correlation between HCA and 
crime rates is that officers may not be fully aware of local crime rates and instead 
use neighborhood characteristics as proxies for crime. Table 10 presents a series 
of models that add block group-level measures of neighborhood demographics 
on top of the suspect demographics we used in the previous subsection.139 
Models 1 and 2 contain variables measuring the proportion of the residential 
population that is Black and that is Hispanic. According to these models, moving 
from a block group without any Black residents to a block group with 100 percent 
Black residents is associated with an 8 to 9 percent increase in the probability 
 
 139. We do not have such data at the precinct level. 
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that an officer will call the area high crime. However, the coefficient for Hispanic 
residents is close to zero and not statistically significant. 
Models 3 and 4 add a series of block group-level socioeconomic measures. 
The variable for Black residents falls by almost half but remains statistically 
significant and the variable for Hispanic residents is now negative and 
statistically significant. Most of the coefficients on the socioeconomic variables 
are small and statistically insignificant. Two statistically significant variables are 
positive: the proportion of residents without a high school degree and the 
proportion of residents who completed high school. 
Models 5 and 6 add fixed effects for officer.140 The results for the variable 
measuring the proportion of Black residents remains the same, but the variable 
for Hispanic residents is now positive and statistically significant. Adding officer 
fixed effects substantially shrunk most of the socioeconomic variables. The only 
two statistically significant coefficients are positive: the proportion of residents 
without a high school degree and the percent of families in poverty. 
We next compare the relative importance of these different variables in 
predicting whether officers invoke HCA. Starting with Model 5, to be 
conservative we only consider the block group-level measure of violent crime 
because the precinct-level measure is negative. The coefficient in the model 
implies that moving from the single safest block group in the city to the single 
most violent is associated with a 2.2 percent increase in the probability of the 
officer calling the area high crime. In Model 6, block group-level arson is the 
only positive coefficient. Moving from a block group with no arson to a block 
group with the most arson in the city is associated with a 2 percent increase in 
the probability that the officer invokes HCA. 
For point of comparison, in both Models 5 and 6, substituting a white non-
Hispanic suspect with a Black non-Hispanic suspect is associated with a 2.1 
percent increase in the probability of the officer invoking HCA. This means that 
the race of the suspect predicts whether the officer will call the area high crime 
roughly as well as the actual crime rate in the area. 
Even more striking, in both Models 5 and 6, moving from a block group 
with no Black residents to a block group with 100 percent Black residents is 
associated with a roughly 4.5 percentage point increase in the probability that the 
officer invokes HCA. In other words, moving from an area with no Black 
residents to an area with all Black residents is associated with a substantially 
larger increase in the probability that an officer invokes HCA than moving from 
the single safest neighborhood in the city to the single most dangerous. 
We next consider whether the results vary by the type of suspected crime. 
Table 11 reproduces Columns 7 and 8 in Table 10 for violence, property, drug, 
and weapons stops, respectively. There is a large and statistically significant 
 
 140. Unlike in prior models, we cannot include fixed effects for block group because the ACS 
measures are constant throughout all years of the study. 
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coefficient on the variables measuring the proportion of residents that are Black 
and that are Hispanic for three of the four crime types: violence, drugs, and 
weapons. At least partially because of the lower sample sizes, there are no clear 
patterns to the socioeconomic variables, aside from the finding that the 
proportion of families in poverty is positively correlated with HCA for violence, 
property, and weapons stops. 
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Table 10. Modeling HCA on Neighborhood Characteristics and Crime in the 
Last 12 Months 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 Mod 5 Mod 6 
  Intercept  0.5526** 0.5092**  0.5041**  0.4769**     
  [0.0135] [0.0155] [0.0407] [0.0392]     
Suspect Characteristics             
  Black Non-Hispanic 0.0105  0.0119†  0.0192**  0.0195**  0.0214**  0.0214** 
  [0.0065] [0.0066] [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0021] [0.0021] 
  Black Hispanic -0.0144† -0.0121 -0.0048 -0.0039  0.0180**  0.0179** 
  [0.0082] [0.0082] [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0026] [0.0026] 
  White Hispanic 0.0017 0.0015 0.0089 0.0077  0.0158**  0.0158** 
  [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0058] [0.0057] [0.0020] [0.0020] 
  Other Race -0.0418** -0.0416** -0.0384** -0.0388** 0.0021 0.0021 
  [0.0073] [0.0073] [0.0072] [0.0072] [0.0026] [0.0026] 
  Age -0.0009** -0.0009** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0002** -0.0002** 
  [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Area Racial/Ethnic  
Composition 
  BG Black Residents 
  
 
 0.0785** 
 
 
 0.0883** 
 
 
 0.0425* 
 
 
 0.0552** 
 
 
 0.0465** 
 
 
 0.0449** 
  [0.0160] [0.0153] [0.0169] [0.0166] [0.0048] [0.0048] 
  BG Hispanic Residents 0.0012 0.0073 -0.0615** -0.0537**  0.0350**  0.0333** 
  [0.0160] [0.0148] [0.0174] [0.0165] [0.0051] [0.0050] 
Area Socioeconomic  
Composition 
  BG No HS Graduation 
    
 
 
 0.1038** 
 
 
 0.0934** 
 
 
 0.0161* 
 
 
 0.0179* 
      [0.0283] [0.0265] [0.0070] [0.0070] 
  BG HS Grad, No College      0.1511**  0.1364**  0.0124† 0.0114 
      [0.0270] [0.0268] [0.0074] [0.0074] 
  BG Income <$20k     0.0222 0.0118 -0.0026 -0.0006 
      [0.0483] [0.0471] [0.0168] [0.0168] 
  BG Income $20k-50k     -0.027 -0.0369 0.0134 0.0143 
      [0.0448] [0.0429] [0.0144] [0.0144] 
  BG Income $50k-125k     0.0456 0.0327  0.0221†  0.0227† 
      [0.0358] [0.0345] [0.0116] [0.0116] 
  BG Median Income     0 0 0 0 
      [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
  BG Assistance     -0.0113 -0.0251 0.0049 0.0041 
      [0.0397] [0.0370] [0.0107] [0.0105] 
  BG Vacant Properties     -0.1541** -0.1321** -0.0069 -0.0066 
      [0.0369] [0.0340] [0.0079] [0.0079] 
  BG Families in Poverty     0.0207 0.0248  0.0197**  0.0186** 
      [0.0252] [0.0234] [0.0063] [0.0063] 
  BG Single-headed        0.0157 0.0164 0.0065  0.0073† 
  Household     [0.0189] [0.0166] [0.0041] [0.0041] 
Crime             
  PCT Violent  0.0005   0   -0.0006**   
  [0.0005]   [0.0005]   [0.0002]   
  BG Violent  0.0081   0.0024    0.0073**   
  [0.0114]   [0.0112]   [0.0028]   
  PCT Non-neg Homicide    -0.0936†   -0.1431**   -0.0156 
    [0.0510]   [0.0496]   [0.0207] 
  PCT Burglary     0.0165**    0.0154**   -0.0001 
    [0.0034]   [0.0035]   [0.0014] 
  BG Arson     1.1207**    0.8356**    0.0877† 
    [0.2086]   [0.2031]   [0.0499] 
Suspected Crime ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Officer Fixed Effect         ✓ ✓ 
Adjusted R^2 (LPM) 0.0141 0.0163 0.017 0.0186 0.4031 0.4031 
N 1,284,370 1,284,370 1,263,340 1,263,340 1,263,340 1,263,340 
  Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 11. Modeling HCA on Neighborhood Characteristics and Crime in the 
Last 12 Months, by Suspected Crime 
 Violent Property Drug Weapons 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 Mod 5 Mod 6 Mod 7 Mod 8 
Suspect Characteristics               
  Black Non-Hispanic 0.0378**  0.0383**  0.0046  0.0042  0.0216**  0.0211**  0.0283**  0.0280** 
  [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0042] [0.0042] 
  Black Hispanic 0.0370** 0.0372** 0.0075 0.0071  0.0227**  0.0225** 0.0172** 0.0169** 
  [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0068] [0.0068] [0.0048] [0.0048] 
  White Hispanic 0.0308** 0.0310** 0.0087** 0.0083**  0.0184**  0.0182** 0.0184** 0.0182** 
  [0.0055] [0.0055] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0052] [0.0052] [0.0043] [0.0043] 
  Other Race 0.0145* 0.0148* -0.0023 -0.0026 0.0015 0.001 0.002 0.0017 
  [0.0063] [0.0064] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0054] [0.0054] 
  Age -0.0007** -0.0007** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0008** -0.0008** 
  [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Area Racial/Ethnic  
Composition 
      
  
  BG Black Residents  0.0384**  0.0395**  0.0039  0.0049  0.0763**  0.0692** 0.0848** 0.0815** 
  [0.0085] [0.0084] [0.0077] [0.0079] [0.0110] [0.0107] [0.0078] [0.0079] 
  BG Hispanic Residents 0.0408** 0.0414** 0.002 0.0001  0.0654**  0.0627** 0.0656** 0.0625** 
  [0.0089] [0.0088] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0125] [0.0123] [0.0089] [0.0088] 
Area Socioeconomic  
Composition  
  BG No HS Graduation 
  
 
0.0084 
[0.0132] 
0.0102 
[0.0133] 
 
 
0.0119  
[0.0130] 
0.0112  
[0.0132]  
 
  
0.0038 
[0.0125] 
 0.0171 
[0.0117] 
  
  
0.006 
[0.0132] 
 0.0211† 
[0.0118] 
  
  
0.0107 
[0.0174] 
 -0.0071 
[0.0174] 
 
 
 0.0063 
[0.0171] 
-0.0097 
[0.0173] 
 
 
0.0033 
 
 
0.0032 
  [0.0107] [0.0107] 
  BG HS Grad, No  
  College 
0.0103 
[0.0105] 
0.0084 
[0.0105] 
  BG Income <$20k  0.0096 0.0132  -0.0599* -0.0599* 0.0634 0.0608 0.0017 0.0016 
   [0.0273] [0.0276]  [0.0257] [0.0258] [0.0416] [0.0410] [0.0224] [0.0223] 
  BG Income $20k-50k  0.0490* 0.0500*  -0.0407† -0.0387† 0.0777* 0.0756* 0.0209 0.0202 
   [0.0243] [0.0245]  [0.0224] [0.0228] [0.0345] [0.0341] [0.0194] [0.0194] 
  BG Income $50k-125k  0.0611** 0.0624**  0.0094 0.0094  0.0593*  0.0606* 0.0138 0.0135 
   [0.0201] [0.0202]  [0.0178] [0.0181] [0.0292] [0.0288] [0.0178] [0.0178] 
  BG Median Income  0.0000* 0.0000*  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   [0.0000] [0.0000]  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
  BG Assistance  -0.0350† -0.0306  -0.0196 -0.0191 0.0242 0.0224 0.0121 0.0099 
   [0.0198] [0.0201]  [0.0185] [0.0188] [0.0234] [0.0235] [0.0157] [0.0155] 
  BG Vacant Properties  0.0064 0.0024  -0.0062 -0.0054 0.0105 0.0091 0.0006 0.0016 
   [0.0156] [0.0154]  [0.0185] [0.0188] [0.0234] [0.0235] [0.0157] [0.0155] 
  BG Families in Poverty  0.0316** 0.0313**  0.0362** 0.0379** -0.0044 -0.0037 0.0176* 0.0170* 
   [0.0120] [0.0119] [0.0107] [0.0109] [0.0146] [0.0143] [0.0086] [0.0086] 
  BG Single-headed    
  Household 
-0.0152† 
[0.0081] 
-0.0137†  
[0.0080] 
-0.0105 
[0.0071] 
-0.0125† 
[0.0074] 
0.0258** 
[0.0099] 
0.0247* 
[0.0097] 
0.0117† 
[0.0063] 
0.0118† 
[0.0063] 
 
Crime               
  PCT Violent 0.0001   -0.0004   -0.0008†   -0.0009**  
  [0.0004]   [0.0004]   [0.0004]   [0.0003]  
  BG Violent 0.0194**   -0.0004    0.0066   0.0095*  
  [0.0054]   [0.0055]   [0.0047]   [0.0045]  
  PCT Non-neg Homicide   0.0489        -0.0312 
    [0.0333]        [0.0301] 
  BG Burglary    -0.0313         
    [0.0321]         
  PCT Motor Vehicle Theft    1.1207**    0.8356**    0.0877†   
    [0.2086]   [0.2031]   [0.0499]   
  PCT Burglary 
  
   
0.0124** 
[0.0029] 
  
  
  BG Arson 
 
     
-0.1606 
[0.0980] 
 0.0319 
[0.0637] 
  BG Drug 
 
     
0.0396** 
[0.0074] 
  
  BG Assault 
 
      
 0.0148* 
[0.0059] 
Officer Fixed Effect ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
N 242,534 242,534 278,482 278,482 139,745 139,745 364,241 364,241 
Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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c. Inter-officer Disparities 
We next test for evidence of inter-officer differences in the perception of 
whether an area is high crime. To provide a rough picture of inter-officer 
disparities, Figure 4 depicts a histogram of the rate at which each officer with 50 
or more stops invoked HCA. The figure reveals dramatic disparities. Roughly 21 
percent of officers invoked HCA in less than 25 percent of stops, while 40 
percent invoked HCA over 75 percent of the time. 
One conventional measure of inter-rater disparity is the mean absolute 
deviation—the average distance of each officer’s HCA invocation rate from the 
absolute average for all officers.141 To compute this number, we regress HCA on 
a model that contains only fixed effects for officer. We then compute the average 
distance of each officer’s fixed effect from the average HCA invocation rate of 
all officers. We find that officers’ HCA invocation rate is, on average, 27 
percentage points away from the absolute average invocation rate of 58 percent. 
Of course, at least some of this variation may be explained by the areas in 
which officers are assigned to patrol. We next regress HCA on fixed effects for 
both officer and census block group. Surprisingly, the absolute mean deviation 
of the fixed effects for each officer creeps up slightly to 29 percent. We obtain 
the same result when we also add suspect-level demographic variables.142 Taken 
together, these empirical results provide evidence of wide inter-officer 
disparities in the assessment of whether an area qualifies as high crime. 
 
 
 
 141. See, e.g., Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Federal Sentencing: Evidence 
from Three Districts (D. Ct., S.D.N.Y., N.D. Cal.), 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 151, 152 (1991) (measuring 
inter-judge sentencing disparities by the mean absolute deviation of each judge’s average punishment 
from the overall average punishment for all judges in a court). 
 142. We cannot add ACS variables because we are using fixed effects for block groups and our 
block group-level ACS variables are constant throughout the study period. 
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Figure 4. HCA Invocation Rate Among Officer with 50 or More Stops 
3. Assumption 3: Do High-Crime Areas Predict Hits? 
We have already found evidence that actual crime levels are poor predictors 
of whether an officer invokes HCA as a basis of suspicion. That finding suggests 
that whether an officer calls an area high crime may have little predictive power 
about whether the suspect is in fact engaged in a crime. We next put that 
hypothesis to test, to the extent we can, by fitting models to predict whether a 
stop results in one of three kinds of “hits”: (1) arresting a suspect; (2) finding a 
weapon; (3) finding any other contraband. 
One caveat is in order. Our analysis here is necessarily limited because we 
can only observe the suspects that were stopped; we cannot observe suspects that 
officers chose not to stop (perhaps because they lacked reasonable suspicion). 
Still, our results are informative even if they are censored. 
Table 12 depicts a series of linear probability models predicting whether an 
officer arrested a suspect during a stop. Model 1 contains an independent variable 
indicating whether the officer invoked HCA as a basis of reasonable suspicion 
and variables indicating the type of suspected crime. The model estimates that 
when an officer invokes HCA, the officer is 1.8 percentage points less likely to 
arrest the suspect. That is a 27 percent relative reduction compared to the baseline 
arrest rate of 6.6 percent. Model 2 adds variables for all other observable bases 
of suspicion in our data,143 which cut the HCA coefficient by just over half. 
Model 3 adds fixed effects for officers, which have little effect on the HCA 
 
 143. To see the results for each of the other variables measuring bases of suspicion, see Table 
A.1 in the Appendix. 
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coefficient.144 These results thus suggest that when an officer invokes HCA as a 
basis of a stop, the stop is less likely to result in an arrest. 
 
Table 12. Predicting Arrest 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
Intercept  0.077**  0.036**   
  [0.002] [0.002]   
High Crime -0.018** -0.007** -0.007** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Suspected Crime ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other Bases of Suspicion  ✓ ✓ 
Officer Fixed Effects     ✓ 
N 1,636,384 1,636,384 1,636,384 
    Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
In Table 13, the dependent variable is whether the officer recovered a 
weapon during a stop. Model 1 estimates that police officers are 0.5 percentage 
points less likely to recover a weapon—a 42 percent relative reduction against 
the baseline rate of 1.2 percent. The results are similar when, in Model 2, we add 
variables for all other observable bases of suspicion in our data.145 When we add 
fixed effects for officers in Model 3, the coefficient remains statistically 
significant but drops by half. The models thus suggest that officers are less likely 
to recover a weapon when they invoke HCA to justify the stop. 
 
Table 13. Predicting Recovery of a Weapon 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
Intercept  0.015**  0.009**   
  [0.001] [0.001]   
High Crime -0.005** -0.004** -0.002** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Suspected Crime ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other Bases of 
Suspicion  ✓ ✓ 
Officer Fixed Effect     ✓ 
N 1,636,384 1,636,384 1,636,384 
    Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
In Table 10, the dependent variable is whether the officer recovered 
contraband other than a weapon. Model 1 estimates that the correlation between 
HCA and the recovery of other contraband is near-zero and statistically 
 
 144. One other potential “hit” variable is whether the officer issued a summons, which is typically 
applicable to only very low-level offenses. When we substituted the arrest variable for the summons 
variable, the results were similar except that for Model 3, the p-value for the HCA variable was just 
above the 0.10 statistical significance threshold, at 0.13. 
 145. For the results for the variables measuring other bases of suspicion, see Table A.2 in the 
Appendix. 
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insignificant. That result doesn’t change when we add variables for all 
observable bases of suspicion in Model 2,146 or when we add fixed effects for 
officer in Model 3. Thus, the models suggest that when an officer invokes HCA 
to justify the stop, the stop is no more likely to result in the recovery of 
contraband. 
 
Table 14. Predicting Recovery of Other Contraband 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
Intercept 0.02** -0.001   
  [0.001] [0.001]   
High Crime 0 0.001 0 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Suspected Crime ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other Bases of  
Suspicion  ✓ ✓ 
Officer Fixed Effect     ✓ 
N 1,636,384 1,636,384 1,636,384 
     Notes: † p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Taken together, these results have at least two important implications. First, 
the absence of a positive correlation between HCA and all three hit variables 
implies that suspects are not more likely to be engaged in a crime when officers 
invoke HCA as a basis of suspicion to justify a stop. Second, the fact that the 
correlation between hits and HCA is negative for arrests and weapons suggests 
that officers may be invoking HCA as a basis of suspicion to manufacture the 
appearance of reasonable suspicion in some of their weakest stops. 
V. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Our empirical investigation raises serious questions about whether 
Wardlow’s empirical assumptions are satisfied in practice. Indeed, at least based 
on administrative data from the NYPD during an era of intensive use of stop and 
frisk policing, implementation of the high-crime area standard appears 
haphazard at best, and discriminatory at worst. Officers call nearly every block 
in the city high crime. Their assessments of high-crime areas are only weakly 
correlated with actual crime rates. The suspect’s race predicts whether an officer 
deems an area high crime as well as the actual crime rate itself. The racial 
composition of the area and the identity of the officer are stronger predictors of 
whether an officer deems an area high crime than the crime rate. And officers 
may even be using high-crime area as cover to bolster the appearance of 
constitutional validity in their weakest stops. 
 
 146. For the results for the variables measuring other bases of suspicion, see Table A.3 in the 
Appendix. 
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Short of reversing Wardlow, the courts have a number of tools at their 
disposal to address some of these problems with the doctrine. Perhaps most 
simply, they could develop more precise definitions about the geographic scope, 
temporal horizon, and kinds of crimes relevant in assessing whether an area is 
high crime. They could also demand more rigorous data in suppression hearings 
to support an officer’s claim that an area is high crime.147 But we suspect this 
solution would not go far enough because it would only address the tiny fraction 
of stops that result in a criminal charge and motion to suppress.148 A more 
aggressive judicial approach might prohibit a department from using high-crime 
areas to justify stops if there is evidence its officers are systematically 
misapplying the standard.149 Arguably, police departments that do not faithfully 
implement the high-crime area standard should not be able to use it to justify 
stops. 
Police departments also have several options to regulate officers’ 
assessments of high-crime areas. As others have noted, one possible solution is 
for departments to promulgate guidelines officially designating certain areas as 
“high crime.”150 Under this system, officers could only invoke HCA to justify 
stops occurring within officially designated zones. Another option is for police 
supervisors to conduct routine audits of stop forms to provide feedback to 
officers about how they should apply the high-crime area standard. A department 
could also release public data to allow for external review. 
Police departments can also look to new technological innovations in the 
field of predictive policing for help. Companies like PredPol and HunchLab151 
have recently developed systems to deliver data to officers’ smart phones about 
crime occurring in the surrounding area in real time.152 We can see at least two 
potential benefits. First, departments could use this technology to improve the 
quality of officers’ information about local crime rates and relieve officers of the 
need to rely on their own subjective and potentially unreliable intuitions. Second, 
going a step further, this technology could also reduce officers’ discretion in 
deciding whether an area is high crime. HunchLab, for example, uses machine 
 
 147. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 4, at 1593. 
 148. See supra note 18, and accompanying text. 
 149. Most simply, departments could provide data on the rate of HCA invocation by crime 
quantile. But departments could also provide some or all of the validation procedures we have applied 
in this paper. 
 150. See supra note 21. 
 151. For a more detailed discussion of these companies’ technologies and services, see ANDREW 
GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING 62–67, 69–72 (2017). 
 152. The Philadelphia Police Department has purchased technology from HunchLab. HunchLab, 
HUNCHLAB: UNDER THE HOOD (2015), https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/hunchlab/HunchLab-Under-the-
Hood.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L98-SUQ2]; HunchLab, 10-minute Overview, YOUTUBE (JAN. 13, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRdcWkH7g0E [https://perma.cc/U2KT-S2NZ]. The Los 
Angeles Police Department has purchased software from Pred Pol. See Nick O’Malley, To Predict and 
to Serve: The Future of Law Enforcement, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (March 31, 2013), 
http://www.smh.com.au/world/to-predict-and-to-serve-the-future-of-law-enforcement-20130330-
2h0rb.html [https://perma.cc/BMP2-5EBJ]. 
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learning algorithms to map “high-crime areas”—typically no larger than a few 
city blocks—and then sends that information to officers on patrol.153 While 
HunchLab’s algorithms currently define high-crime areas based on departmental 
goals of crime reduction, police departments could develop new algorithms 
based on the Fourth Amendment’s definition of high-crime areas. 
In defining high-crime areas empirically, departments must choose their 
data carefully. First, they should take care to minimize the influence of racial and 
socioeconomic biases on the construction or definition of high-crime areas. As 
many others have noted, the output of machine learning algorithms can be 
affected by biases in the data on which they are trained.154 For example, if a 
police department assigns a disproportionate number of officers to patrol 
communities of color, those communities will contain a disproportionate number 
of arrests. Defining high-crime areas based on arrest data would then make 
communities of color appear more dangerous than they are and might also create 
a kind of high-crime feedback loop.155 Data on criminal complaints filed by 
citizens are perhaps a better—albeit imperfect—measure of crime that are less 
likely to incorporate biases or generate feedback loops.156 
In addition to the specific proposals we have offered here, the implications 
of our analysis extend beyond Wardlow and the high-crime area standard. 
Indeed, officers rely on countless other factors in justifying the hundreds of 
thousands of stops they conduct each year, and officers may very likely be 
applying some of those factors unfaithfully as well. That’s particularly true for 
softer factors, like suspicious bulges and furtive movements, which officers 
frequently cite as bases for stops.157 Yet, we are unaware of any other empirical 
 
 153. HunchLab, supra note 152. 
 154. See Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 
2019). 
 155. See, e.g., Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing, 81 
PROCEEDINGS OF MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1 (2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.09847 
[https://perma.cc/8HD4-4246] (finding crime data systems can “be susceptible to runaway feedback 
loops, where police are repeatedly sent back to the same neighborhoods based on prior deployments 
regardless of the true crime rate”). 
 156. Still, complaint data is not without its own set of biases. Residents of certain 
neighborhoods—particularly those that are wealthier and have healthier relationships with local 
police—may report crimes more frequently, thereby giving the appearance that they have 
disproportionately more crime relative to neighborhoods with lower reporting rates. 
 157. Some courts have already expressed serious doubts about some softer factors, like furtive 
movements. See, e.g., Floyd v. New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“‘Furtive 
movements’ are an insufficient basis for a stop or frisk if the officer cannot articulate anything more 
specific about the suspicious nature of the movement.”). Other subjective factors may also include 
suspicious bulges, sights or sounds of crime, or evasive actions. These factors are likely vulnerable to 
cognitive distortion and bias, especially in the context of race or threatening situations. See Jennifer 
Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 876, 880 (2004) (finding that subjects were more likely to perceive a weapon after seeing an 
image of a person with a darker skin shade); Andrew R. Todd, Kelsey C. Thiem & Rebecca Neel, Does 
Seeing Faces of Young Black Boys Facilitate the Identification of Threatening Stimuli?, 27 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 384, 384 (2016) (finding that “participants had less difficulty . . . identifying threatening stimuli and 
more difficulty identifying nonthreatening stimuli after seeing [images of] Black faces than after seeing 
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studies that attempt to validate the reliability and predictive validity of the factors 
that police use to form reasonable suspicion. Our analysis of high-crime areas is 
therefore just the first step. Empirical legal scholars should begin validating other 
common bases of reasonable suspicion. 
Due to challenges in data availability, that project will be more difficult 
than our efforts to evaluate the high-crime area standard here. Indeed, unlike 
crime data, which is collected and published by police departments across the 
country, data on other common Fourth Amendment factors are not readily 
available. To gather that data, empirical legal scholars would need to directly 
observe officers’ conduct and the conduct of suspects on the street. 
At least two research methodologies can help advance this research agenda. 
First, the popularization of high-definition body cameras offers a new window 
to collect data on the process by which officers form reasonable suspicion. 
Researchers today can systematically code body-camera footage to evaluate the 
accuracy of police officers’ claims that, for example, suspects were engaged in 
suspicious or evasive movements, were casing a commercial establishment, were 
concealing contraband, or were engaged in any other actions indicative of crime. 
Second, empirical researchers can apply systematic social observation 
(SSO), a traditional method of data collection in the policing literature.158 In SSO 
studies, a neutral observer accompanies an officer on patrol, recording what the 
officer does and says based on predetermined rules and protocols. SSO is useful 
because it allows participant observers to directly witness how officers form 
suspicion and decide whether to stop suspects. That officers would be aware they 
are being observed, of course, could bias their behavior,159 but these concerns 
can be diminished by careful training and monitoring of researcher-police 
interactions.160  
At least one study by Geoffrey Alpert, John MacDonald, and Roger 
Dunham successfully used this approach to study how officers in the Savannah 
Police Department—an agency with approximately 400 officers—develop 
 
White faces”); see also Richard R. Johnson & Mark A. Morgan, Suspicion Formation Among Police 
Officers: An International Literature Review, 26 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 99, 100, 107–09 (2013) (discussing 
how officers use racial characteristics and non-verbal cues in developing suspicion about suspects on 
the street). 
 158. See STEPHEN MASTROFSKI ET AL., SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION OF PUBLIC POLICE: 
APPLYING FIELD RESEARCH METHODS TO POLICY ISSUES, vii (1998) (describing the methodology in 
depth); Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Systematic Observation of Natural Social Phenomena, 3 SOC. 
METHODOLOGY 3, 4 (1971) (detailing methods of observation and recording of social interactions in 
situ). 
 159. E.M. Hoeben, W. Steenbeek & L.J.R. Pauwels, Measuring Disorder: Observer Bias in 
Systematic Social Observation at Streets and Neighborhoods, 34 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 221, 
224–27 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-016-9333-6 [https://perma.cc/XUM8-9REY] (noting 
sources of bias including inter- and intra-observer variation, prior experience with police, and reactivity 
of the officers under observation). 
 160. Reiss, Jr., supra note 158, at 3–5, 27–30 (discussing potential challenges of estimating the 
effects of observation in the measurement of social phenomena). 
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reasonable suspicion.161 Trained observers accompanied randomly selected 
officers on 132 8-hour shifts during a period of 8 months. The observers were 
trained to “document the police officer’s actions and reactions as well as any 
interactions that occurred with citizens” and “record the sequence in which the 
events unfolded.”162 They were also trained to “remind and prompt officers to 
‘think out loud’” when something or someone raised officers’ suspicion.163 And 
they were also trained to record “when officers seemed to take notice of 
something and whether they acted on it, and to question the officer about his or 
her thoughts and feelings about the observation.”164 The most important data that 
the observers recorded were the bases of suspicion identified by the officers, but 
they also recorded other relevant variables, including suspect race, the racial 
composition of the area, and the type of action in which the suspect was 
engaged.165 In total, the study observed officers forming suspicion 174 times, 
which demonstrates the feasibility of using SSO to collect data on the process by 
which officers form reasonable suspicion. 
In future empirical work, legal scholars can use body camera footage or 
SSO to validate the most common factors invoked by officers to establish 
reasonable suspicion. They can do so by assessing the factual accuracy of police 
officers’ claims about the presence of these factors and by examining whether 
they are in fact predictive of criminal behavior. Armed with that information, 
scholars and courts will have a clearer picture of what Fourth Amendment factors 
provide a reliable basis for reasonable suspicion and meaningful protection 
against unreasonable intrusions on personal privacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 161. Alpert, MacDonald & Dunham, supra note 111, at 417–19. 
 162. Id. at 418. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 419 (noting that observers reported “behavioral criteria”—which the authors defined 
as “specific actions by citizens that were either illegal or interpreted . . . as suspicious”—and 
nonbehavioral criteria—such as the suspect’s “appearance, the time and place” and any suspect 
descriptions provided to the officer). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379361 
2019] THE END OF INTUITION-BASED HIGH-CRIME AREAS 401 
APPENDIX 
Table A.1. Modeling Arrest, Full Results 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
Intercept  0.077**  0.036**   
  [0.002] [0.002]   
Circumstances Leading to Stop       
  High Crime -0.018** -0.007** -0.007** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
  Criminal Object    0.129**  0.123** 
    [0.006] [0.005] 
  Suspect Description    0.034**  0.036** 
    [0.002] [0.002] 
  Suspicious Bulge    0.004*  0.015** 
    [0.002] [0.001] 
  Casing   -0.016** -0.018** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Lookout   -0.019** -0.018** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Clothes   -0.019** -0.015** 
    [0.002] [0.002] 
  Drug Transaction    0.024**  0.012** 
    [0.004] [0.002] 
  Furtive Movements   -0.001 0.001 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Violent Crime    0.003†  0.005** 
    [0.002] [0.002] 
  Other    0.026**  0.033** 
    [0.002] [0.002] 
Additional Circumstances       
  Witness Report    0.084**  0.085** 
    [0.003] [0.002] 
  Proximity to Crime    0.003*  0.014** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Criminal Associates    0.004* 0.002 
    [0.002] [0.002] 
  Sights/Sounds of Crime    0.042**  0.052** 
    [0.005] [0.004] 
  Change Direction   -0.003* -0.001 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Evasive Behavior    0.027**  0.029** 
    [0.002] [0.001] 
  Ongoing Investigation    0.009**  0.004** 
    [0.002] [0.001] 
  Time   -0.005** -0.002* 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Other    0.035**  0.046** 
    [0.004] [0.003] 
Suspected Crime ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Officer Fixed Effect     ✓ 
N 1,636,384 1,636,384 1,636,384 
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Table A.2. Modeling Recovery of a Weapon, Full Results 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
Intercept  0.015**  0.009**   
  [0.001] [0.001]   
Circumstances Leading to Stop       
  High Crime -0.005** -0.004** -0.002** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
  Criminal Object    0.087**  0.085** 
    [0.004] [0.004] 
  Suspect Description   -0.002** -0.001* 
    [0.001] [0.000] 
  Suspicious Bulge    0.016**  0.020** 
    [0.002] [0.002] 
  Casing   0 -0.006** 
    [0.000] [0.001] 
  Lookout   -0.001** -0.001* 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
  Clothes   -0.006** -0.004** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Drug Transaction   0 0 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
  Furtive Movements   -0.006** -0.005** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Violent Crime    0.001*  0.001† 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Other    0.008**  0.011** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
Additional Circumstances       
  Witness Report    0.005**  0.006** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Proximity to Crime   -0.002**  0.001** 
    [0.001] [0.000] 
  Criminal Associates   -0.001* -0.001 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Sights/Sounds of Crime    0.009**  0.010** 
    [0.002] [0.002] 
  Change Direction   -0.001** -0.001** 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
  Evasive Behavior    0.001† 0 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
  Ongoing Investigation    0.003**  0.003** 
    [0.001] [0.000] 
  Time   0.001 0 
    [0.001] [0.000] 
  Other    0.014**  0.012** 
    [0.002] [0.001] 
Suspected Crime ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Officer Fixed Effect     ✓ 
N 1,636,384 1,636,384 1,636,384 
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Table A.3. Modeling Recovery of Other Contraband, Full Results 
  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 
Intercept  0.02** -0.001   
  [0.001] [0.001]   
Circumstances Leading to Stop       
  High Crime  0  0.001  0 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
  Criminal Object    0.058**  0.054** 
    [0.003] [0.003] 
  Suspect Description    0.001*  0.002* 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Suspicious Bulge    0.003**  0.007** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Casing   -0.001  0 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
  Lookout   -0.006** -0.005** 
    [0.001] [0.000] 
  Clothes   -0.006** -0.004** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Drug Transaction    0.020**  0.013** 
    [0.003] [0.002] 
  Furtive Movements    0.003**  0.005** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Violent Crime   -0.002** -0.002* 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Other    0.011**  0.012** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
Additional Circumstances       
  Witness Report    0.007**  0.006** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Proximity to Crime    0  0.003** 
    [0.001] [0.000] 
  Criminal Associates    0.003*  0 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Sights/Sounds of Crime    0.018**  0.021** 
    [0.002] [0.002] 
  Change Direction    0.001†  0.001† 
    [0.001] [0.000] 
  Evasive Behavior    0.012**  0.012** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Ongoing Investigation    0.006**  0.002** 
    [0.001] [0.001] 
  Time   -0.001* 0 
    [0.001] [0.000] 
  Other    0.014**  0.016** 
    [0.002] [0.001] 
Suspected Crime ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Officer Fixed Effect     ✓ 
N 1,636,384 1,636,384 1,636,384 
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